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Abstract
This paper presents a 3x3 general equilibrium model of an OLG-
economy with technological uncertainty, heterogeneous agents and
quasi-homothetic preferences to analyze structural change between
the real and the financial sector as well as within the financial sector.
Besides the consumption and investment good two types of financial
services are produced. The three factors of production are: Capital,
skilled and unskilled labor. Financial services are needed for trans-
forming savings into future consumption possibilities. The financial
market provides deposits and an incomplete set of securities. Payoffs
of assets are determined by the future profitability of the technolo-
gies in which they are invested. We show the channels through which
structural change and inequality reinforce each other and show how
they simultaneously emerge from rising per-capita income, an increase
in skill supply and technical change.
Keywords: Structural change, financialization, quasi-homothetic port-
folio decision, inequality
JEL classification: O16, J31, D90
∗We wish to thank Timo Boppart, Claire Ce´le´rier, David Dorn, Peter Egger, Reto
Fo¨llmi, Michel Habib, John Hassler, Jean-Charles Rochet, Christoph Winter, Fabrizio
Zilibotti and participants in seminars at the University of Zurich, at the Jahrestagung
des Vereins fu¨r Socialpolitik 2015, the 30th Annual Congress of the European Economic
Association (EEA), the 2015 congress of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics
(SSES), the Zurich Workshop on Economics 2014 in Solothurn and 2015 in Lucerne for
helpful discussions and suggestions. Severin Baumann, Kathrin Friedrich and Nathalie
Frischknecht provided excellent research assistance.
†University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zu¨richbergstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zu¨rich.
E-mail: josef.falkinger@econ.uzh.ch
‡University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zu¨richbergstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zu¨rich.
E-mail: sabrina.studer@econ.uzh.ch
§University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zu¨richbergstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zu¨rich.
E-mail: yingnan.zhao@econ.uzh.ch
1 Introduction
Financialization and inequality are topics that stir up the public debate
– among experts as well as outside the scientific community. Discussions
about financialization have gained momentum by the financial crisis
(Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013; Philippon and Reshef, 2012, 2013); the
inequality debate was brought “in from the cold” (Atkinson, 1997) towards
the end of the last century and has reached the center court recently with the
Piketty book (Piketty, 2014). This paper argues that the two phenomena are
genuinely related to each other. Structural change towards and within the
financial sector, as observed over the last three decades, enhances inequality.
And rising inequality fosters financialization.
We present our argument in a model that comprises the most basic tools
provided by economics for analyzing sectoral structure and distribution. Fi-
nancialization means two things: The weight of financial business relative to
non-financial business increases and the type of financial business changes.
From a macroeconomic perspective the first aspect can be summarized as
structural change towards the financial sector: The financial sector expands
relative to the production sector. We do not approach this question from
a monetary or financial aspect like the nominal transaction volume of the
financial relative to the real sector. Our perspective is a real economics one:
The financial sector employs resources and generates income for the resources
employed. That is, there must be some kind of output (service) that is pro-
duced, sold and purchased. The relevant measures are therefore employment
and income or output shares; the essential component to be modeled are the
production function of the financial sector and the demand function for finan-
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cial services. For capturing the second aspect of financialization – the shift
from conventional banking type activities to sophisticated modern finance
– an appropriate model structure requires to have two separate sub-sectors
within the financial sector which differ in their demand and production char-
acteristics. In sum, we have therefore a three sector model – one production
sector and two financial sub-sectors.
Inequality requires to have heterogeneous agents which differ in their endow-
ments. In our model we have low-skilled and high-skilled workers. They are
mobile between sectors and cost-minimal skill-intensities differ across sectors.
As a consequence, the interaction between sectoral structure and inequality
comes through the skill premium. The focus on inequality between low-
skilled and high-skilled workers is on the one side motivated by the empirical
fact that the rise in inequality over the last decades has been driven to a
large extent by skill premia and skill composition, as the ample evidence
from the skill-bias literature shows (for instance, Machin and Van Reenen
(1998); Piketty and Saez (2003)). On the other side, we see it as a first im-
portant step, which later might be complemented by elements which focus
on the functional distribution of income between workers and capitalists or
on rents. There is capital in our model; it must be. After all, financial mar-
kets have the purpose to transform, under risk, current resources into future
production possibilities. This requires, on the one side, saving decisions and,
on the other side, capital investment into revenue bearing inputs to future
production. In our model, returns on capital are generated by two different
types of technologies (robust and risky) which transform savings into future
consumption possibilities.
Structural change can be caused by the supply side: Changing endowments
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or technical change. The huge literature on directed technical change, for
instance, has emphasized this channel (Acemoglu, 2002). There is, however,
also an important role for the demand side. Although often neglected, in-
come effects are essential for aggregate developments (Boppart, 2014, 2015;
Fo¨llmi and Zweimu¨ller, 2008). We account for demand side effects by assum-
ing that agents have quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary form.
The specific finance aspect enters the demand side of our model through
the following channel: Demand for financial services comes from the need
to manage portfolios and to finance investments into profitable projects in a
way that reflects the preferences of the agents who own the endowments of
the economy. Stone-Geary preferences account for the fact that part of the
savings is motivated by future subsistence expenditures.
In our model the finance industry correctly assesses risks and productivity
of investment projects and earns no rents. This is against popular views;
neither does it reflect a common view of the authors of this paper. Actu-
ally, there are many sources for imperfections in the financial sector. For
instance, prices and payoffs of financial products may be distorted by ne-
glected correlation (Studer, 2015), or insider knowledge and barriers to entry
generate rents for financial intermediation. A salient example is the so called
finance premium. There is convincing evidence that a finance premium ex-
ists (Ce´le´rier and Valle´e, 2015; Philippon and Reshef, 2007, 2012), that is,
the same type of labor earns more in a finance job than in other occupa-
tions. Nonetheless, from a methodological point of view, we consider it as
important to start with a benchmark model in which distortions are kept
at a minimum. Given the firm basis of such a benchmark, one can then be
bold in looking at the role of imperfections which certainly exists in reality
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in general and in the financial business in particular. Arguably, rents can be
more easily extracted when they go along with the tide rather than against
it. So it is important to know if outcome changes are supported by changes
in economic fundamentals. Section 7 gives extensions which provide some
ideas how distortions affect the comparative-static results of the benchmark
model. Moreover, in the quantitative implementation of our model in Section
9, we try to separate the rent component of the expansion of the financial
sector, in particular new finance, from the part that is driven by economic
fundamentals.
There is a long literature on the impact of financial development on economic
growth (Levine, 2005).1 The causes of financial sector growth and the chang-
ing structure of financial activities, which are the topic of this paper, have
been less scrutinized. The literature related to our paper in a more narrow
sense is rich as far as the empirical side is concerned. In particular, Philip-
pon and his co-authors did pioneering empirical work on financialization. On
the theoretical side the situation is quite different. To our knowledge there
are only two attempts to explain structural change towards finance in a gen-
1While the dominant view in this literature was that financial development is positive
for growth, a more skeptical view has emerged in the recent past. Gru¨ndler and Weitzel
(2012) or Law and Singh (2014) provide evidence that more finance is good for growth
at low levels of financial development but harmful beyond a certain threshold. Financial
sector growth seems to harm in particular skill-intensive (Kneer, 2013) and R&D intensive
(Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015) industries. Moreover, negative growth effects are robust
if different measures of financialization are used, for instance market capitalization rather
than credits (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) or the employment share of the financial sec-
tor (Capelle-Blancard and Labonne, 2011). Beck et al. (2012) find that in particular the
shift from enterprise credits to household credits is detrimental for growth and inequality
enhancing.
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eral equilibrium framework. Philippon (2014) sketches in his notes a 2x2
model with a real and a financial sector both producing with capital and la-
bor. The financial sector produces intermediation services for households and
firms. The focus is on the equilibrium effects of changes in intermediation
costs. Improvements in financial intermediation tend to raise real wages but
have in general an ambiguous effect on the GDP-share of the financial sector.
The GDP-share of finance rises if more firms need intermediation services.
Structural change between services for safe assets and services for risky in-
vestments or wage inequality are not addressed nor do income effects play a
role for the relative size of the financial compared to the real sector. There is
only one type of labor, one interest bearing asset and preferences are homo-
thetic. Moreover, there are two types of households - infinitely living saver
households and households which live two periods and borrow when young.
By contrast, in our paper all households live for two periods and save when
young; savings can be invested in a portfolio of safe and risky assets. The
second theoretical explanation of structural change towards finance is pro-
vided by Gennaioli et al. (2014). Like in Philippon (2014) a 2x2 framework
is considered and structural change within the financial is not in the focus
of the paper. The real sector produces with capital and labor, the financial
sector consists of financial intermediation experts in whom investors trust.
Therefore they are willing to pay them fees. Like in our set-up households
live two periods and save when young. Moreover, they also account for risky
assets. Inequality among households, however, plays no role. The saving
decision is exogenous - young households save the entire wage - and the port-
folio choice is determined by mean-variance preferences. The main driver for
structural change towards finance in their model is the idea that financial
intermediation services are not only required for the financing of new capital
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but also for the preservation of the entire stock of capital accumulated over
time. Since in a Solow type growth model the capital coefficient increases,
the share of financial services in GDP increases, too. In our model, which
focuses on comparative-static equilibrium effects of skills and endowments,
technologies and preferences, no long-run accumulation effect is considered.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the formal
structure of our 3x3 model and its building blocks. Section 3 analyzes the
production equilibrium, Section 4 derives the demand for goods and finan-
cial services. Section 5 summarizes the effects of inequality on the sectoral
structure of the economy. In Section 6 the general equilibrium is character-
ized and comparative-static effects are derived analytically. Section 7 gives
extensions which provide some ideas how distortions affect the comparative-
static results of the benchmark model. In Section 8 an alternative to the
benchmark specification of the model is considered and the robustness of the
results is discussed. Section 9 confronts the theoretical results with empirical
evidence from the U.S.. Moreover, a calibration exercise is provided. Main
conclusions are summarized in the last section.
2 Model
2.1 Model set-up
We model a 3 sector, 3 factor economy. There is a production sector X and
a finance sector Z with two sub-sectors Z1 and Z2. All sectors employ low-
skilled and high-skilled workers. Produced goods are used for consumption
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and investment. For transforming savings into future consumption possibili-
ties, more or less risky technologies are available which use capital as input
and deliver consumption goods as output in the next period. (As an exten-
sion we present a variant of the model, in which capital is used in the X
sector to set up firms.) Financial services have the function to support the
transformation of savings into future consumption possibilities. Services Z1
are used for safe savings. Services Z2 provide state-dependent instruments
and are used for savings in securities with risky returns.
We consider a (static) two-period OLG economy. The future t = 1 is un-
certain. It consists of a set Θ of distinguishable events and a set Θ¯ of
events which are indistinguishable in t = 0. The future state space is{
{θ|θ ∈ Θ} , Θ¯
}
. We have prob(Θ)=µ and prob(θ|Θ)=piθ with
∑
θ∈Θ piθ = 1.
2
For θ ∈ Θ, state-contingent investment possibilities are available which pay
off if and only if state θ is realized. No state-contingent investment possibil-
ities exist for Θ¯ which reflects “true uncertainty”.
2.2 Saving decision and portfolio choice
There are N agents who live for two periods. They are endowed with a skill
level and work as either high-skilled or low-skilled worker when young. The
number of low-skilled workers is L¯ and the number of high-skilled workers is
H¯. The efficiency units of labor provided by a high-skilled and a low-skilled
agent are given by bH and bL, respectively. They are paid a wage per effi-
ciency unit at rate, wl, l ∈ {L,H}. Income y
l = wlbl can be consumed in
t = 0 or be saved and transformed to tomorrow’s consumption possibilities.
2This structure is taken from Falkinger (2014).
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Agents are assumed to have quasi-homothetic preferences of the Stone-Geary
form: Beyond a subsistence level to be expended they spend income on the
good produced in the X-sector.3 They have an instantaneous indirect util-
ity function of the form log(et − e¯t) where et is the expenditure for good
X consumption and e¯t ≥ 0 is the subsistence expenditure level in time t.
Intertemporal preferences are assumed to be additive logarithmic with a dis-
count factor δ.
The intertemporal problem consists of two parts: A saving decision and
a portfolio choice. On the one hand, agents have to decide how much to
expend on consumption, e0, and how much to save, s. On the other hand,
they have to put the saving in an appropriate portfolio of financial products.
For this purpose they demand financial services. With the support of these
services they decide how much of the saving is put into deposits, d, with a safe
payoff r, and how much into risky state-contingent financial products (Arrow
securities), fθ, which pay off Rθ if state θ is realized and zero otherwise. We
assume that all Arrow securities have the same expected payoff. Specifically,
there exists R > 0 so that
Rθ =
R
piθ
, θ ∈ Θ. (1)
For transforming one unit of deposit, one unit of financial services from sub-
sector 1 is needed; and for transforming one unit of Arrow securities, one
unit of financial services from sub-sector 2 is required. Therefore, given
the portfolio choice, {d, f} , with f =
∑
θ∈Θ fθ, agents have to pay a fee
3Achury et al. (2012) show that a Stone-Geary type utility function is appropriate for
explaining stylized facts of household finance like higher saving rates of households with
higher lifetime income or a larger fraction of risky assets in the portfolios of wealthy agents.
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T = pz1d + pz2f to the financial sector, where pz1 and pz2 are the prices for
financial services Z1 and Z2, respectively.
4 Suppose the fee is charged in
the first period and agents internalize the fee in their portfolio choice. The
expected utility maximization problem of an agent l with income yl is then
given by:
max
sl,{f l
θ
}θ∈Θ,dl
EU = log(el0−e¯0)+δ
[
µ
∑
θ∈Θ
piθ log(e
l
θ − e¯1) + (1− µ) log(e
l
Θ¯ − e¯1)
]
s.t.
el0 + (1 + pz1)d
l + (1 + pz2)
∑
θ∈Θ
f lθ = y
l (2)
elθ =


Rθf
l
θ + rd
l, if θ ∈ Θ
rdl, otherwise
(3)
sl =
∑
θ∈Θ
f lθ + d
l. (4)
In Section 4 aggregate demand functions for goods and financial services are
derived from this program.
2.3 Production of goods (X-sector)
Firms in the X-sector employ low-skilled and high-skilled labor as input
factors in a linear homogeneous production function
X = Gx(HX , LX),
4Without loss of generality, it was assumed that financial services are measured in units
of savings. Without this normalization the cost of financial services per unit of saving
would be p˜zi = pzini rather than pzi , where ni denotes the units of financial services
needed for one unit of saving in deposits (i = 1) and securities (i = 2), respectively.
10
where HX , LX denote respective labor employment in the X-sector. There
is perfect competition with zero-profit prices. This means:
px = cx(wH , wL), (5)
where cx(wH , wL) are the unit costs and wH , wL are the wage rates per
efficiency units.
The goods price is taken as nume´raire, px = 1. Revenue X is distributed to
labor as follows:
Wx = wLLx + wHHx = G
x(Lx, Hx),
where Wx is total wage earned in the X-sector.
Capital is used in technologies which transform savings into future consump-
tion possibilities. Two types of technologies are available: A robust tech-
nology, which transforms under any condition (i.e., in Θ and Θ¯) one unit
of capital invested today into r units of output tomorrow; furthermore, for
θ ∈ Θ, a set of risky technologies specialized to θ-contingent environments.
One unit of capital invested in technology θ delivers Rθ units of output if
state θ ∈ Θ occurs tomorrow and zero otherwise. Deposits are invested
in the robust technology; savings in securities are invested in the respec-
tive risky technologies. The smaller the measure piθ of the state to which a
risky technology is targeted, the more productive the capital invested in the
technology. Equation (1) expresses this relationship between specialization
advantage and risk.
The separation of the production of old age consumption goods by capital
from the labor based production of the goods consumed and invested in the
11
active period of life is convenient from an analytical point of view. Under
a more realistic perspective, however, capital is typically a prerequisite for
producing with labor. In the extension in Section 7.5, we show that essen-
tially the same payoff structure arises if X is produced under monopolistic
competition and capital is needed to set up firms – by robust and risky set-up
technologies, respectively. Asset returns are then generated by the operating
profits of the firms the set up of which has been financed by the asset.
In almost all of the further analysis only the relative payoff between robust
and specialized risky technologies matters. It is given by:
ρ ≡
r
R
.
The only exception is the discounting of future subsistence expenditure, e¯1
r
,
for which the level of the return on the robust technology matters.
2.4 Production of financial services (Z-sectors)
The financial sector Z consists of two sub-sectors, Z1 and Z2. They provide
financial services for transforming savings through safe and risky assets into
future consumption possibilities. (The assets are invested in the robust and
risky technologies, and households get the generated revenue as return on
their investment.) Zi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is produced with a linear homogeneous
production function Gzi(.):
Zi = G
zi(Hzi , Lzi), i ∈ {1, 2} (6)
where Hzi , Lzi denote employment levels in the Zi-sector.
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In reality, fixed costs may play an important role in the provision of financial
services. We consider such costs as an extension in Section 7.1 and show how
changes in fixed costs affect the equilibrium outcomes of our model.
We assume perfect competition in the Z-sectors and have therefore zero-profit
prices
pzi = czi(wH , wL), i ∈ {1, 2} (7)
where czi(wH , wL) are the unit costs.
Revenue pziZi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is distributed to labor
Wzi = wLLzi + wHHzi = pziG
zi(Hzi , Lzi), i ∈ {1, 2}
where Wzi is total labor income earned in the Zi-sector.
As emphasized in the introduction, perfect competition in the Z-sector is
an ideal benchmark rather than a description of reality. The role of rents is
considered in the extension presented in Section 7.2.
3 Production equilibrium and supply of goods
and financial services
At the production side, the essential feature we want to address is varia-
tion in skill intensities. For an explicit comparative-static analysis we take
production functions of the Cobb-Douglas form.
Let, for j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, G
j have Cobb-Douglas form
Gj (Lj, Hj) = AjL
1−αj
j H
αj
j ,
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where Aj is total factor productivity and αj is the factor share of high-skilled
workers in sector j.5 Then
aLj =
1
Ajκ
αj
j
, aHj =
κ
1−αj
j
Aj
(8)
are the input coefficients, and cost-minimizing skill-intensities κj ≡ a
H
j /a
L
j
are given by
κj(ω) =
γj
ω
, γj ≡
αj
1− αj
, (9)
where ω ≡ wH/wL is the relative wage per efficiency unit of skilled labor
compared to unskilled labor, which reflects the skill premium (per efficiency
unit).6
3.1 Wages and prices
We have for variable unit costs in sector j:
cj (wH , wL) =
w
1−αj
L w
αj
H
AjΓj
, Γj ≡ α
αj
j (1− αj)
1−αj . (10)
Using (10) and px = 1 in the zero-profit price equation (5), we obtain
wL = AxΓxω
−αx , (11)
5The magnitudes of the total factor productivities depend on the unit in which financial
services are measured. Since financial services are measured in units of savings, Ax <
Az1 ≤ Az2 is a plausible restriction on total factor productivities. Analytically no such
restriction is required for the results.
6Note that κj =
bHH¯j
bLL¯j
. According to (9), the inverse labor demand function is ω =(
γj
bL
bH
)
L¯j
H¯j
. Thus, we have skill-biased technical change (in the sense of an outward shift
of skilled-labor demand relative to unskilled-labor demand) if the output elasticity αj of
high-skilled labor rises or if there is low-skilled labor augmenting progress (that is bL/bH
rises). It is worth noting that αj is a sector-specific component whereas bL/bH is uniform
across sectors.
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and from (7), for i ∈ {1, 2},
pzi =
Ax
Azi
Γx
Γzi
ωαzi−αx . (12)
In sum, prices for financial services are related to the skill premium in the
following way:
Fact 1. The price of financial services Zi, pzi, is an increasing function of
ω if αzi > αx. If αzi = αx, then pzi is invariant with respect to ω. Moreover,
αzi > αx (αzi = αx) is equivalent to κzi > κx ( κzi = κx).
As known from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this fact holds quite generally
and is not an artifact of the Cobb-Douglas specification.
In the further analysis we make the following assumption about the factor
intensity ranking of the three sectors.
Assumption 1. αz2 ≥ αz1 and αz1 ≥ αx with at least one inequality holding
strictly.
In Section 9 we provide evidence on the sectoral skill intensities. Assumption
1 is consistent with the evidence.
3.2 Resource constraints
Total labor endowment in efficiency units is given by
L = bLL¯, H = bHH¯,
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so that the “skill richness” of the total labor force is
k ≡
bHH¯
bLL¯
.
The aggregate resource constraints are:
aLxX + a
L
z1
Z1 + a
L
z2
Z2 = bLL¯
aHx X + a
H
z1
Z1 + a
H
z2
Z2 = bHH¯
(13)
with alj, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, l ∈ {H,L} being functions of the skill premium ω
defined in (9).
For illuminating the drivers of structural change on the production side it
is worth looking, as an intermediary step, separately at the allocation of
resources within the financial sector and the resource allocation between
financial services and goods production.
We focus first on the allocation within the financial sector. Let total em-
ployment (in efficiency units) in the financial sector be given by Lz and Hz,
respectively. If αz2 = αz1 , the allocation of Lz and Hz on Z1 and Z2 is deter-
mined by the demand side only. If αz2 > αz1 , then the resource constraints
aLz1Z1 + a
L
z2
Z2 = Lz and a
H
z1
Z1 + a
H
z2
Z2 = Hz solve to:
Z1 =
Lz(κz2 − kz)
aLz1(κz2 − κz1)
, Z2 =
Lz(kz − κz1)
aLz2(κz2 − κz1)
, (14)
where kz ≡
Hz
Lz
is the “skill richness” of the labor force in the financial sector.
This implies for the supply structure within the financial sector:
Z2
Z1
=
aLz1
aLz2
kz − κz1
κz2 − kz
≡ χ(ω, kz) (15)
The following result on within sector structural change follows immediately.
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Proposition 1. If αz2 > αz1, for a given level of employment in the financial
sector, an increase in the skill premium or a rise in the skill richness of labor
employed in the financial sector shift the supply structure from traditional
financial services Z1 to new financial services Z2.
Proof. According to (9), κz2 > κz1 if αz2 > αz1 . For κz2 > κz1 ,
∂χ
∂ω
> 0 and
∂χ
∂kz
> 0 as known from the Rybczynski analysis.
Moreover, for a given level of the skill richness, kz, of labor employed in the
financial sector, system (13) can be written in the form
aLxX + Lz = bLL¯
aHx X + kzLz = bHH¯
(16)
which leads to the following result.
Fact 2. For a given level of skill richness in the financial sector, we have
Lz
Lx
=
k − κx
kz − k
. (17)
Proof. System (16) solves to Lx = bLL¯
kz−k
kz−κx
, Lz = bLL¯
k−κx
kz−κx
. Assumption 1
implies kz > k > kx.
Thus, for a given skill premium ω (so that κx is fixed) and a given skill richness
kz in the financial sector, employment in the financial sector is ceteris paribus
higher in an economy with a large share of skilled labor k.
In a general equilibrium, however, employment in the financial sector is de-
termined simultaneously with the allocation of resources to the goods sector.
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4 Income distribution and aggregate demand
The demand for financial services comes from the need of agents to transform
current savings into future income. For this purpose the asset-holding agents
require financial products and expert services from the financial sector which
support them by choosing and managing a portfolio of deposits and securities
appropriate for their preferences.
The program max EU subject to (2)-(4) is only well-defined if e0 > e¯0 and
e1 > e¯1. This requires that
yl = blwl > y¯ ≡ e¯0 + (1 + pz1)
e¯1
r
, l ∈ {L,H} . (18)
y¯ denotes the present value of future subsistence expenditure in units of
today’s final output.
Assuming yH ≥ yL, which is equivalent to ω ≥ bL/bH , y
L > y¯ is sufficient
for (18). The following fact gives a necessary and sufficient condition for
yL > y¯. The signs below the parameters show the sign of the respective
partial derivatives.
Fact 3. There exists a threshold ω+L so that y
L > y¯ if and only if ω <
ω+L (Ax
+
, Az1
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
, e¯1
r
−
).
Proof. Appendix C.
Savings in securities is positive if and only if the following condition holds:
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µR (1 + pz1) > (1 + pz2) r. The condition can be rewritten in the form
µ > pρ, p ≡
1 + pz2
1 + pz1
, ρ ≡
r
R
. (19)
pρ is the relative net payoff (i.e., after correction for costs of financial services)
of savings in safe assets compared to savings in risky assets. If the condition
is violated, the expected net payoff of risky investment is lower than the net
payoff of risk-free investments and all saving is in deposits.
In the next subsection we analyze individual saving and expenditure behav-
ior. Subsection 4.2 deals with aggregate demand.
4.1 Individual saving and expenditure behavior
As is derived in Appendix A, under the assumption that inequalities (18)
and (19) are satisfied, individual savings in deposits and securities are given
by
dl = sd
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
, l = {L,H} , (20)
and
f l = sf
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz2
, f lθ = piθf
l, θ ∈ Θ, l = {L,H} , (21)
respectively, with
sd =
1− µ
1− pρ
, sf =
µ− pρ
1− pρ
. (22)
Apart from the savings for future subsistence expenditure, e¯1
r
, in form of
deposits, the saving level is proportional to the supernumerary budget yl −
y¯. In real terms, the value of the supernumerary budget, which is relevant
as a basis for saving, depends on the price of the financial service charged
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on the particular form of savings – pz1 for deposits and pz2 for securities.
The split of the saving on safe and risky assets is given by the marginal
propensities to save in deposits, sd, and in securities, sf , respectively. The
propensity of safe investment increases in the relative net payoff of the safe
asset, pρ, and declines with the measure µ of states covered by securities.
The propensity of risky investment reacts in the opposite direction.7 In sum,
the two propensities add up to one so that total saving, sl = dl+ f l, is given
by:
sl =
δ
1 + δ
yl − y¯
1 + pz1
(sd +
sf
p
) +
e¯1
r
(23)
If saving in securities is more costly than saving in deposits, sf is discounted
by the fee differential p.8
In contrast to net savings, gross savings include the fee to be paid for the
financial services consumed in support for the transformation of savings into
future income. Adding up (1 + pz1)d
l + (1 + pz2)f
l, we have
sl + tl =
δ
1 + δ
(yl − y¯) +
(1 + pz1)e¯1
r
, (24)
where tl = pz1d
l + pz2f
l denotes the total fee paid by agent l.
Current expenditures el0 = y
l − (sl + tl) are thus:
el0 =
1
1 + δ
(yl − y¯) + e¯0. (25)
7For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0 and pz1 = pz2 = 0, we have sd =
1−µ
1−ρ and sf =
µ−ρ
1−ρ . Defining
R¯ = Rµ and ρ¯ =
r
R¯
, we can rewrite the two terms in the form sd =
R¯(1−µ)
R¯−r/µ
and sf =
µR¯−r/µ
R¯−r/µ
. Thus, with Cobb-Douglas preferences and zero financial intermediation cost,
the portfolio choice coincides with the one in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), where the
conditional expectation R¯ of the productivity of risky technologies is used rather than the
unconditional expectation R.
8If inequality (19) is violated, then saving in securities is unattractive in the first place
and we have a corner solution with sf = 0 and sd = s =
δ
1+δ
y−y¯
1+pz1
+ e¯1r .
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For the discussion of structural change on the demand side, the effect of
income on the portfolio structure is of particular importance.9 According to
(20) and (21), richer agents invest a larger share of their saving in risky assets
than the relatively poorer ones. The reason is that the provision for future
subsistence expenditure by safe investments has diminishing weight if people
become richer. This means that saving in deposits has the character of a
“necessity” and saving in risky securities is a “luxury”. Moreover, if present
subsistence expenditure is more pressing than future subsistence expenditure,
people save a smaller part of their income when they are poor and the saving
rate s/y rises when they get richer.10 The following fact summarizes this
important implication of our model.
Fact 4. Let e¯0 > 0 or e¯1 > 0.
a) If e¯1 > 0 , then
∂(f/d)
∂y
> 0.
b) For e¯0 > 0,
∂(s/y)
∂y
> 0 if and only if δe¯0
1+pz1
> e¯1
r
[
1+δ
sd+sf/p
− δ
]
. (Note that
9Boppart (2015) analyzes the skill-content of the consumption basket of different income
groups. With rising income, a household’s demand shifts towards skill-intensive sectors
(including financial services; also shown by Suellow (2015) in detail).
10The role of subsistence requirements for the saving behavior may call into mind the
effects of fixed costs in the model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), where saving rate
and portfolio structure depend on an agent’s wealth due to constrained participation in
the use of financial intermediation service. While we consider the effect of a participation
constraint as an extension in Section 7, no such constraint exists in the baseline considered
here. But everybody has to expend a certain sum to survive. This biases saving rate
and portfolio structure. If people get richer the pressure of the subsistence requirements
diminishes. There are of course other important differences to Greenwood and Jovanovic.
In particular, all forms of saving require costly financial intermediation in our framework.
Moreover, our focus is on inequality in labor income rather than wealth inequality and on
structural change rather than growth.
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for p = 1 the square-bracketed term reduces to one.)
Proof. Part a) follows immediately from (20) and (21). For b) the definition
of y¯ in (18) is used.
4.2 Aggregate demand for goods and financial services
Saving and expenditure behavior follow affine-linear functions. Therefore,
aggregate behavior depends on two things: The level of aggregate income
and the number of people over which the income is distributed. The latter
comes in through the fact that subsistence requirements are bound to the
existence of an agent, independent of her or his income.
Aggregating the two pools of agents, we have
N = L¯+ H¯
for the size of the population and
W = wLbLL¯+ wHbHH¯
for the level of aggregate income. In view of (11), the latter amounts to
W = AxΓxbLL¯ω
−αx(1 + ωk). (26)
The following fact shows that aggregate income, measured in units of X, is
an increasing function of the skill premium (ω = wH/wL).
Fact 5. Under Assumption 1, W is increasing in ω. We have
∂W
∂ω
= Awω
−αx(1− αx) (k − κx) > 0 (27)
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with Aw ≡ AxΓxbLL¯.
Proof. According to (26),
∂W
∂ω
= Awω
−αx
[
−
αx
ω
(1 + ωk) + k
]
= Awω
−αx
[
−
αx
ω
+ (1− αx)k
]
= Awω
−αx(1− αx)
[
k −
αx
1− αx
wL
wH
]
.
According to (9),
αx
1− αx
=
wHa
H
x
wLaLx
.
Thus, the square-bracketed term reduces to k − κx, which is positive if As-
sumption 1 holds.
Financial services provision is more skill intensive than goods production, at
least on average. Therefore, in terms of goods, aggregate wage income rises
with the skill premium. A different matter is the impact of the skill premium
on the purchasing power for financial services, the price of which rises too
with the skill premium.
Aggregating individual investments in deposits, given by (20), we obtain
D =
(
sd
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
)
N, (28)
where w¯ ≡ W
N
denotes average income. In an analogous way, we have from
(21):
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz2
N, Fθ = piθF (29)
for aggregate investments in securities. Aggregate savings are
S =
[
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz1
(
sd +
sf
p
)
+
e¯1
r
]
N (30)
and aggregate current expenditures are
E0 =
[
1
1 + δ
(w¯ − y¯) + e¯0
]
N. (31)
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5 The effect of the skill premium on the sec-
toral structure
In a general equilibrium, sectoral structure and skill premium are determined
simultaneously. As an intermediate step we characterize the sectoral struc-
ture as a function of the skill premium and exogenous parameters, keeping
in mind that in the end the skill premium depends on exogenous parameters
too. Not all possible values of skill premia and parameters are of interest, but
only those which are reasonable candidates for a general equilibrium, in which
both financial sectors are viable, the subsistence of all agents is feasible and a
positive skill premium results. The following paragraphs characterize the set
of parameter configurations which guarantee these equilibrium properties.
Assumption 1 that financial service provision is more skill intensive than
goods production (κx < k < κz) is equivalent to
γx
k
< ω < γz
k
as we know from
(9). At ωmin ≡
γx
k
the Z-sector vanishes and beyond ωmax ≡
γz
k
there would
be no longer an X-sector. Hence, we consider the range ω ∈ (ωmin, ωmax) in
our search for the equilibrium skill premium.
Moreover, according to Fact 3, ω < ω+L (Ax
+
, Az
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
, e¯1
r
−
) is required for guar-
anteeing subsistence for low-skilled agents. ω+L ≥ ωmax holds if Ax, Az and
bL are large enough (for given e¯0,
e¯1
r
), or e¯0 and
e¯1
r
are not too high (for given
Ax, Az, bL). If ω
+
L < ωmax, only range ω ∈ (ωmin, ω
+
L ) is feasible.
Finally, ω ≥ bL/bH is required for y
H ≥ yL. This is guaranteed if ωmin ≥
bL/bH , which is equivalent to
γx ≥
H¯
L¯
.
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In terms of exogenous fundamentals, the requirements mean that we restrict
the possible combinations of exogenous model parameters
ξ =
{
Ax, Az1 , Az2 , αx, αz1 , αz2 , bL, bH , H¯, L¯, e¯0,
e¯1
r
, ρ, µ, δ
}
to the following set:
Ξ0 ≡
{
ξ
∣∣∣∣H¯L¯ ≤ γx, γxk < ω˜max
}
, (32)
where k = bHH¯
bLL¯
and ω˜max ≡ min
{
ωmax, ω
+
L (Ax, Az1 , bL, e¯0,
e¯1
r
)
}
.
In general, the interaction of the allocation of resources between the X-sector
and the Z-sector, on the one hand, and the allocation within the Z-sector
on Z1 and Z2, on the other hand, are hard to disentangle in an economically
transparent way. For qualitatively robust insights into important channels
we have to reduce complexity on either the demand or the supply side. In the
benchmark analysis presented in Section 5.1, 5.2 and 6, we shut down relative
price effects within the financial sector by assuming identical technologies for
Z1 and Z2.
Assumption 2. αz1 = αz2 = αz > αx and Az1 = Az2 = Az.
11
Assumption 2 allows us to put focus on the income effects. In Section 8 we
consider the case αz2 > αz1 = αx as a robustness check. Moreover, in the
quantitative implementation of the model we solve the model numerically for
αj values that match U.S. data where αz2 > αz1 > αx .
11Without normalization n1 = n2 = 1, the assumption would read
Az1
n1
=
Az2
n2
. That is
the provision of financial services per unit of saving must be equal in the two sub-sectors.
For instance, new financial services may be provided more productively than traditional
services, but, at the same time, more units of services are needed to transform a unit of
saving into future payoff by complex rather than simple financial products.
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We analyze first the impact of an increase in the skill premium on structural
change within the financial sector.
5.1 Within change
The value added in sub-sector Zi, i = {1, 2} , is equal to aggregate expendi-
ture on the produced services. According to (28) and (29), aggregate expen-
ditures for financial services have the following structure:
pz2F
pz1D
=
sfζη¯
sdη¯ +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
≡ Φ(sd
−
, sf
+
,
e¯1
r
−
, ζ
+
(ω), η¯
+
(ω)) (33)
where ζ(ω) ≡
pz2
pz1
1+pz1
1+pz2
, η¯(ω) ≡ w¯−y¯
1+pz1
and sd, sf are defined in (22). While the
impacts of saving propensities sd and sf on the within structure are straight-
forward, the role of the skill premium is in general ambiguous. ζ(ω) expresses
relative price effects. Since pz1 = pz2 = pz under Assumption 2, ζ(ω) reduces
to one (see discussion in Section 8 for the case of changing relative prices
within the Z-sector). η¯(ω) is the average supernumerary income weighted by
the cost of future subsistence. It captures the income effect on within struc-
tural change. If e¯1 = 0, there is no income effect on the demand structure
for financial services. For e¯1 > 0, the impact of the skill premium on the
value-added share Φ of sector Z2 compared to Z1 depends in the benchmark
only on the shape of η¯(ω). The following lemma characterizes the properties
of η¯(ω).
Lemma 1. Let exogenous model parameters belong to Ξ0 defined in (32).
a) If ξ ∈ Ξ1 ≡ Ξ0 ∩ {ξ|αx + αz > 1}, then there exists a threshold
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ω(Ax
?
, Az
?
, k
−
, bLL¯
N
?
, e¯0
−
) with ∂η¯
∂ω
|ω=ω = 0 so that:
∂η¯
∂ω
< 0 for ω < ω,
∂η¯
∂ω
> 0 for ω > ω.
Especially, define Ξ1D ≡ {ξ|ω > ωmin} and Ξ
2
D ≡ {ξ|ω < ω˜max}. If ξ ∈
Ξ1 − Ξ
1
D, then
∂η¯
∂ω
> 0 for all ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max). If ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
2
D, then
∂η¯
∂ω
< 0 for all ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max).
b) For the comparative static analysis we have:
η¯

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−


Proof. Appendix C.
On the one hand, a higher ω raises the average wage. On the other hand,
the prices of financial services are increasing, which has a negative effect on
the purchasing power. According to Lemma 1, the first effect dominates if
the skill premium is sufficiently high.
In sum, we have the following partial results about within structural change
in the finance sector.
Proposition 2. Let e¯1 > 0.
a) A rise in the skill premium leads to structural change from sub-sector
Z1 to sub-sector Z2 (in terms of value-added) at high levels of the skill
premium (ω > ω) and to structural change from Z2 to Z1 at low levels of
skill premium.
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b) For a given skill premium, a rise of Ax, Az, k,
bLL¯
N
or a decline of e¯0,
e¯1
r
lead to structural change from Z1 to Z2. A rise of µ or a decline of ρ also
lead to change from Z1 to Z2, even if e¯1 = 0.
Proof. (33), Lemma 1 and the fact that a rise in µ or a decline in ρ raise sf
(at cost of sd).
The proposition describes only a partial effect. For a full comparative-static
equilibrium analysis, we have to combine the direct effects of exogenous fun-
damentals with their indirect effects through the equilibrium skill premium.
We come back on the total effects in Section 6.4.
5.2 Between change
For αz1 = αz2 = αz and Az1 = Az2 = Az, aggregate supply of financial
services reduces to:
Z(= Z1 + Z2) = AzLzκ
α
z .
The allocation between the X-and the Z-sector is then determined by the
resource constraints:
aLxX + a
L
zZ = bLL¯,
aHx X + a
H
z Z = bHH¯.
In an analogous way to (14), we get from this as solution:
X =
bLL¯
aLx
κz − k
κz − κx
, Z =
bLL¯
aLz
k − κx
κz − κx
. (34)
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Substituting aLj =
1
Ajκ
αj
j
, we have:
Z
X
=
Az
Ax
ψ(ω
+
, k
+
), ψ(ω, k) ≡
καzz
καxx
k − κx
κz − k
. (35)
This gives us the following result for the comparative-static effects on the
supply structure. 12
Proposition 3. An increase in the skill premium shifts the supply structure
from goods production to financial services provision. An increase in the high
skilled labor share (k) or biased technical change in favor of financial services
(so that total factor productivity Az rises relative to Ax) have the same effect.
Proof. The signs of the respective partial derivatives in (35) follow from
κz > κx and the Rybczynski analysis.
The proposition characterizes the supply structure as a function of exoge-
nous fundamentals and the skill premium. The supply structure interacts
with demand, which depends on aggregate income and prices and thus also
reacts to the skill premium. To close the analysis, we have to determine
the equilibrium skill premium. Section 6.3 will then summarize the general
equilibrium effect of the skill premium on the between sectoral structure.
12 Note that (35) characterizes the supply structure of labor produced output. If capital
is used as set-up capital as in the extended model in Section 7.5, then X is indeed the
total size of final output in the goods sector. In the baseline model considered here there
is in addition the output generated for old age consumption by past capital investments.
Thus, the total size of goods transactions becomes X¯ ≡ X + rD + µRF with X =
E0 + S = E0 + D + F and the between structural change ratio is Ψ¯ ≡
pzD+pzF
X¯
=
pzD+pzF
X+rD+µRF with D, F , E0 and S from (28)-(31). It is, ceteris paribus, increasing in ω
if S′E0 − SE
′
0 − (µR − r)(DF
′ − FD′) > 0 where D′, F ′, S′ and E′0 are the respective
derivatives with respect to ω. This means, if the between change (S′E0 − SE
′
0) is larger
than within change (DF ′ − FD′) multiplied with the return difference (µR− r).
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6 General equilibrium
Aggregate demand in the X-sector is composed of consumer goods demand,
E0, and investment goods demand, S = D + F . On top of it, old agents
consume the output generated by the capital they invested in the period
before.
Aggregating the individual budget constraints (2), we obtain:
E0 +D + F + pz1D + pz2F = W, (36)
whereW = Wx+Wz,Wx = X andWz = pz1G
z1(Hz1 , Lz1)+pz2G
z2(Hz2 , Lz2).
If the Z1 and Z2-markets are cleared, we have G
z1(Hz1 , Lz1) = D and
Gz2(Hz2 , Lz2) = F so that (36) reduces to
E0 +D + F = X.
Thus, the goods market is automatically cleared if the markets for financial
services are cleared.
Aggregate demand for financial services comes from savings in deposits D
and savings in securities F . Adding up (28) and (29), we have for aggregate
demand in the Z-sector
ZD =
(
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
)
N. (37)
From (34) we know that aggregate Z-supply in a production equilibrium is
ZS = AzbLL¯κ
αz
z
k − κx
κz − κx
(38)
where aLz =
1
Azκ
αz
z
was used.
30
6.1 Existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibrium
Both market sides are functions of ω (which works through w¯ and pz on the
demand side and through skill intensities κx, κz on the supply side). For a
stable equilibrium, the condition
dZD
dω
<
dZS
dω
(39)
is required at the market clearing ω-value. (Since pz is increasing in ω,
inequality (39) guarantees that a rise in price pz goes hand in hand with a
reduction of excess demand and a fall in the price reduces excess supply.)
The supply function is characterized by the following fact.
Fact 6. ZS is an increasing strictly concave function of ω starting at
lim
ω→ωmin
ZS = 0 and approaching AzbLL¯k
αz at ωmax. More specifically,
ZS = AzbLL¯
γαzz
γz − γx
g(ω
+
, k
+
), g(ω, k) = ω−αz(kω − γx). (40)
Proof. Appendix C.
For the demand side the following fact applies.
Fact 7. Aggregate demand for financial services is given by:
ZD =

 δ
1 + δ
η¯

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−

+ e¯1
r

N,
where η¯ was discussed in Lemma 1. For all ξ ∈ Ξ1, Z
D is defined and
positive on the ω-domain (ωmin, ω˜max). Moreover, it is either U-shaped in
ω (for ξ ∈ ΞD ≡ Ξ1 ∩ Ξ
1
D ∩ Ξ
2
D), increasing over the entire domain (for
ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
1
D) or declining for all ω (if ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
2
D).
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Proof. Equation (37) and Lemma 1.
ωI ω
∗
IωIIω
∗
II
ZD : Case I
ZD : Case II
ZS
Z
ω
ω˜maxωmin
Figure 1: Equilibrium in the financial service sector.
Figure 1 shows in the (ω, Z)-space the supply and demand curves under the
assumption that
ZD(ω˜max) < Z
S(ω˜max), (41)
where ω˜max was defined in (32).
13
13If ω˜max = ω
+
L , then Z
D(ω˜) is to be read as ZD(ω) < ZS(ω) for all ω < ω+L − ǫ,
with ǫ arbitrarily small. Figure 1 assumes ξ ∈ ΞD; yet, from Fact 7 it is obvious that
for ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
1
D the Z
D-curve would cross the ZS-curve at ω∗ as in Case I, whereas for
ξ ∈ Ξ1 − Ξ
2
D we would have at ω
∗ the situation illustrated in Case II.
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If inequality (41) holds, then the market clearing condition ZD(ω) = ZS(ω)
has a unique solution ω∗ within (ωmin, ω˜max). Moreover, stability condition
(39) is fulfilled at ω∗. This establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Define ΞE = Ξ1 ∩
{
ξ|ZD(ω˜max) < Z
S(ω˜max)
}
. For all ξ ∈
ΞE, there exists a unique and stable equilibrium.
Proof. Continuity of ZD on ω ∈ (ωmin, ω˜max) and properties of the shape of
ZD established in Fact 7.
6.2 Equilibrium skill premium
For the comparative-static equilibrium analysis, we have to look at the excess
demand function ZD − ZS. Because of stability condition ∂(Z
D−ZS)
∂ω
< 0, we
know that for any exogenous change of a component i of ξ ∈ ΞE
sign
∂ω∗
∂i
= sign
∂(ZD − ZS)
∂i
|ZD=ZS .
For signing the impact of exogenous fundamentals on the equilibrium, we
express excessive demand explicitly as a function of model parameters. Using
(26) and (12), we have
w¯N
1 + pz
= AxbLL¯D1(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, k
+
), (42)
where D1 ≡
Γx(1+ωk)
ωαx+AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz
and the signs below parameters in (42) express the
signs of their impact on D1. Term D1 captures the purchasing power effect.
Moreover, substituting (12) for pz1 in (18) we can write the term
δ
1+δ
y¯
1+pz
− e¯1
r
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in the form:
D0(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, e¯0
+
,
e¯1
r
−
) =
1
1 + δ
[
δe¯0
1 + AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
−
e¯1
r
]
. (43)
Term D0 captures the effect of the subsistence requirements on the aggre-
gate demand for financial services. The sign of the square-bracketed term
is positive if the present subsistence expenditure e¯0 dominates the future
subsistence expenditure e¯1. It is negative if e¯1 dominates e¯0. For the eco-
nomic interpretation of the relevant notion of dominance it is useful to recall
AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx = pz. Thus D0(ω|
Az
Ax
, e¯0,
e¯1
r
) > 0 (=, < 0) if and only if
δe¯0
1 + pz
>
e¯1
r
(=, <
e¯1
r
, resp.). (44)
This is exactly the condition for a rising (constant, declining, resp.) saving
rate derived in Fact 4.b). (Note that p = 1 in the benchmark case.) If
present subsistence expenditures are more pressing than future ones, people
save more and demand more financial services if they become richer and get
farther away from subsistence problems.
Using D0 and (42) in (37) and combining the result with (40), we conclude
that ZD − ZS is equal to the term
AxbLL¯

 δ
1 + δ
D1(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, k
+
)−
N
AxbLL¯
D0(ω|
Az
Ax
+
, e¯0
+
,
e¯1
r
−
)−
Az
Ax
γαzz
γz − γx
g(ω, k
+
)

 .
(45)
Hence, e¯1 has a positive impact on Z
D−ZS and thus on ω∗; e¯0 has a negative
impact. Az
Ax
and k have opposing effects so that their impacts cannot be signed
unambiguously by inspection of (45).
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The most interesting question is how technical change affects the equilibrium
skill premium. For this we have to look at the impact of AxbLL¯
N
on ZD −ZS.
(Since Az
Ax
has an ambiguous effect, we only consider uniform progress across
sectors, that is, total factor productivity Az rises pari passu with Ax.) The
answer depends on condition (44). If δe¯0
1+pz
> e¯1
r
, D0 is positive and ω
∗
increases if AxbLL¯
N
rises. If δe¯0
1+pz
< e¯1
r
, then D0 is negative and ω
∗ declines if
AxbLL¯
N
increases. For e¯0 = e¯1 = 0,
AxbLL¯
N
has no effect.
In sum, we have the following partial effects of the parameters on the equi-
librium skill premium:14
ω∗(
Az
Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+/−
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
+
), (46)
where the impact of AxbLL¯
N
depends on the cases discussed above.
All addressed effects refer to the partial derivatives, that is, they hold under
the condition that other parameters do not change simultaneously. Econom-
ically this means, the effects come from a single source. In particular, for the
effect of bLL¯
N
on ω∗, skill richness k = bHH¯
bLL¯
is held constant in the comparison.
This requires a careful interpretation of the described effect of bLL¯
N
. The fol-
lowing fact provides an economically meaningful description of the variations
which are consistent with a constant k and a rise in bLL¯
N
.
Fact 8. A rise in bLL¯
N
is consistent with a constant k if there is:
a) Uniform factor-augmenting technical progress, raising bL pari passu with
bH .
14The signs below the parameters represent the partial derivatives. The combination
+/− is used for pointing to case-dependent impacts. A question mark means that the
impact of the respective parameter cannot be signed without further investigation.
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b) A shift in labor supply from unskilled to skilled labor accompanied by factor
augmenting progress that is biased towards the low-skilled. (Note that such
low-skilled labor augmentation depresses the relative wage of the unskilled
– like skill-biased technical change.)
Proof. Use N = L¯ + H¯ for N
bLL¯
=
1+ H¯
L¯
bL
. Hence, k = bHH¯
bLL¯
remains constant
under a decrease in N
bLL¯
if either bL and bH rise proportionally and H¯/L¯
does not change or H¯
L¯
rises and bL rises such that
bL
bH
grows proportionally to
H¯
L¯
.
With these clarification the following proposition summarizes the compara-
tive static equilibrium results.
Proposition 5. Let e¯0 > or e¯1 > 0.
a) Uniform productivity growth across sectors (raising Ax and Az propor-
tionally) or uniform factor-augmenting technical progress (raising bL and
bH proportionally) have a positive effect on the equilibrium skill premium
if the present subsistence expenditure dominates the future subsistence ex-
penditure; if the future subsistence expenditure dominates, then the skill
premium declines.
b) A shift of labor supply from unskilled to skilled work accompanied by factor
augmentation which is biased towards low-skilled labor has the same effect
on the equilibrium skill premium as factor augmenting progress that is
uniform.
c) The equilibrium skill premium rises, if future subsistence expenditure (e¯1)
increases or present subsistence expenditure (e¯0) declines.
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Proof. Fact 8 and main text.
For the economic intuition behind a) and b) it is useful to remember Fact
4.b). If present subsistence expenditure weighs more than future subsistence
requirements then the saving rate and therefore demand for financial services
are rising with income. Since the financial services are more skill intensive
than goods, this rise of demand induces a rise in the skill premium. The
rising income in turn comes from technical progress or a better educated
workforce. The intuition for c) is: If future subsistence expenditure is high,
agents have to save more and need more financial services; and if present
subsistence expenditure is low, they can afford to save more and to spend
more for financial services.
It is worth noting that positive subsistence expenditure (e¯0 > 0 or e¯1 > 0)
is essential for the comparative-static results stated in Proposition 5. For
e¯0 = e¯1 = 0, expression (45) boils down to
AxbLL¯

 δ
1 + δ
D1

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Az
Ax
+
, k
+

− Az
Ax
γαzz
γz − γx
g
(
ω, k
+
) .
Thus, uniform productivity growth has no effect in this case nor has bLL¯
N
.
6.3 Structural change between production and finan-
cial service sectors
Combining the results of subsections 6.2 and 5.2, we obtain the following
results for the structural change between production and financial services
in equilibrium:
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Proposition 6. For all ξ ∈ ΞE, at given
Az
Ax
, k, any change in other exoge-
nous fundamental which raises (lowers) the skill premium leads to structural
change from X to Z (Z to X, respectively).
Proof. Equation (35). Since pz rises with ω, the rise of ψ immediately implies
that pzZ
X
rises too.
6.4 Structural change within the financial sector
Finally, for structural change within the financial sector, we have the follow-
ing results in equilibrium:
Proposition 7. Let ω be the threshold defined in Lemma 1 and parameters
fulfill ξ ∈ ΞE. Then, under the assumption that prices do not differ across
financial services, the following comparative static results hold for structural
change within the financial sector as long as e¯1 > 0:
a) At high levels of the skill premium (ω∗ > ω), a fall of e¯0 leads to a shift
from Z1 to Z2. In addition, if present subsistence expenditure dominates
future subsistence expenditure, uniform productivity growth across sectors
(i.e. a proportional rise of Ax and Az) as well as an increase in
bLL¯
N
change
the structure within the financial sector from Z1 towards Z2. According
to Proposition 5 and 6, these changes induce an increase in the inequality
level ω∗, accompanied by a simultaneous structural change from the goods
to the financial service sector.
b) At low levels of the skill premium (ω∗ < ω), a fall of e¯1 leads to a shift from
Z1 to Z2. In addition, if future subsistence expenditure dominates present
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subsistence expenditure, uniform productivity growth across sectors as well
as and an increase in bLL¯
N
change the structure within the financial sector
from Z1 towards Z2. However, according to Proposition 5 and 6, these
changes correspond to a decrease in the inequality level ω∗, accompanied
by a simultaneous a structural change from the financial service to the
goods sector.
c) Financial product innovation (a rise of µ) or rising attractiveness of risky
investments (a decline of ρ) lead to structural change from Z1 to Z2, even
if e¯1 = 0.
Proof. Using (33), (46), and Lemma 1, we have
Φ

sd− , sf+ ,
e¯1
r
−
, η¯
+

 ω∗
+/−

Az
Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+/−
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
+

 , Ax
+
, Az
+
, k
+
,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−



 ,
where the signs below the parameters show the sign of the respective partial
derivative of the functions Φ{·}, η¯[·] and ω∗(·). The plus below ω∗ applies
for ω∗ > ω, the minus for ω∗ < ω. The plus below AxbLL¯
N
applies for the case
that e¯0 dominates e¯1; the minus applies if e¯1 dominates e¯0. For the impacts
of µ and ρ note that sf is rising and sd is declining in µ and rising in ρ.
It is worth noting that for e¯1 = 0 there is no income effect on the portfolio
structure so that the channel between skill premium and financial structure
is shut down. Since in the benchmark considered here relative price effects
within the financial sector were shut down too, for e¯1 = 0 only financial
innovation (a rise in µ) and rising relative returns on risky investment (a
decline of ρ) remain as sources of structural change within the financial sector.
This will change in the model variant with different technologies for Z1 and
Z2 considered in Section 8.
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The punchline of the general equilibrium analysis in the baseline model is:
When the skill premium has reached a certain level, a rise in average in-
come leads to rising inequality and to two fold structural change towards
and within the financial sector simultaneously. The rise in income can be
triggered by a general rise of productivity or by an increased selection of the
population into higher education (accompanied by labor augmenting progress
that makes low-skilled labor abundant relative to skilled labor). The income
effects generated by technical progress or education are robust drivers of the
developments outlined at the beginning of this paper. They can explain a
rising skill premium and the twofold structural change towards and within
finance by a single source, holding everything else constant. Yet, of course, in
reality the effects triggered by this source are overlaid by many other things
that happen at the same time. The model points to a series of other exoge-
nous fundamentals that affect skill premium and economic structure. Thus,
the specific combination of determinants that actually determine the ob-
served patterns of inequality and structural change can only be identified by
empirical analysis. The quantitative analysis in Section 9 illustrates possible
combinations of exogenous factors which are consistent with the development
observed from 1980 onwards. Before turning to the quantitative analysis, we
want to add realism to the model by considering extensions which account
for important aspects that have been neglected in the analysis presented so
far.
40
7 Extensions
Five extensions are considered: Fixed costs in the financial sector, rents in
the financial sector, distorted portfolio choices of households, participation
constraints in finance sub-sector Z2 and set-up capital for firms. Like the
equilibrium analysis in the benchmark, the extended analysis is based on
Assumption 2. Moreover, for avoiding too many case distinctions, dominance
of e¯0 over e¯1 is assumed in this section.
7.1 Fixed costs in the financial sector
Suppose that financial services are provided by banks. A bank b, serving Nb
clients, needs Kb = fBNb units of goods to set up the capacity to serve them.
We assume that the fixed cost Kb is financed by a lump-sum fee
τ = fB
imposed on the clients. That is, bank size and number of banks affect neither
aggregate fixed costs
KB = fBN
nor the households’ budget constraint. In the latter, yl reduces to yl − τ
so that the supernumerary budget becomes yl − y¯+, with y¯+ = y¯ + τ =
e¯0 + fB + (1 + pz1)e¯1/r.
Hence, fixed cost fB has the same comparative-static effects on household
choices as an increase in subsistence expenditure e¯0. For the X-market this
means, on the one hand, the absorption of X by households’ consumption
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and investment is reduced by KB = fBN . On the other hand, KB is spent
by banks to set up the capacity to serve their clients. In sum, we have
E0 − fBN +D + F +KB = X
for the goods market clearing, which reduces to the condition in the bench-
mark model:
E0 +D + F = X
since fBN = KB. Hence, goods markets are cleared whenever the Z-markets
are cleared.
In the markets for financial services, demand is reduced by the fact that
w¯ − y¯+ rather than w¯ − y¯ is now the relevant supernumerary income. The
supply side remains unaffected. In equilibrium, the implications of fixed costs
can be derived by looking in the benchmark model at the effect of a rise of
e¯0 to e¯0 + fB.
Proposition 8. A decline in fixed costs fB has the following effects:
a) The skill premium rises.
b) The between sectoral structure shifts from X to Z.
c) The within sectoral structure shifts from Z1 to Z2 at high levels of the skill
premium (ω∗ > ω). At low levels of the skill premium (ω∗ < ω) the effect
is ambiguous.
Proof. Comparative-static results for e¯0 in Proposition 5, 6 and 7.
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7.2 Rents in the financial sector
Suppose that a club of agents in the finance sector has the power to ex-
tract rents from financial service provision.15 One may think of rentiers who
have unearned property rights or an elite subgroup of employees in the finan-
cial sector. We make two crucial assumptions: First, whoever are the rent
extracting agents, they spend the rent like other agents. Thus, the redistri-
bution of rents has no income effect on aggregate demand. (Total subsistence
requirements and aggregate supernumerary income remain unchanged). Sec-
ond, nobody can enter the club from outside so that the rent does not affect
labor allocation.
In the presented model, two instruments can be used to extract rents. First,
a fixed fee τ˜ as in extension 7.1, but:
τ˜ > fB.
Aggregate rents (τ˜ − fB)N are lump-sum redistributed. Everybody pays
τ˜ and an elite N0 receives the rent. Thus, average supernumerary income
becomes
w¯ − y¯ − τ˜ +
N0
N
(τ˜ − fB)N
N0
= w¯ − y¯ − fB.
In this case, the rent has no effects on aggregate income, expenditure struc-
ture, labor allocation, relative prices or the skill premium. Nevertheless,
there is lump-sum redistribution of income from the real to the financial
sector and within the financial sector. This redistribution implies for the
15As pointed out in the introduction, there is robust evidence that indeed a substantial
finance premium exists. This paper deals with the consequences of rents, not with possible
explanations why they exist.
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sectoral income shares:
pzZ + (τ˜ − fB)N
X
and
pzF + ν(τ˜ − fB)N
pzD + (1− ν)(τ˜ − fB)N
,
respectively, where ν is the share of the elite rent going to new finance. It
is obvious that a rising finance rent increases the total finance share in the
economy. For a given rent distribution ν, a rise in τ˜ raises the income share
of new finance relative to traditional finance as long as νD > (1− ν)F , that
is as long as the new finance share is not too large. A rise in ν trivially leads
to a rise in the new finance share.
A second instrument of rent extraction would be to charge a markup on unit
cost prices in the financial sector so that households have to pay
p˜zi = pzi(1 + oi)
for financial services.
Using (12), we have
p˜zi = (1 + oi)
Ax
Azi
Γx
Γzi
ωαzi−αx .
In the benchmark case with pz1 = pz2 a rent o1 = o2 = o decreases D1 in (42)
to AxΓx(1+ωk)
ωαx+
(1+o)AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz
and decreases D0 in (43) to
1
1+δ
[
δe¯0
1+(1+o)AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
− e¯1
r
]
.
Hence, o has an ambiguous impact on ZD − ZS and thus on ω
∗.
Proposition 9. Rents in the financial sector have the following effects:
a) If rents are extracted by lump sum fees, they have no allocative equilibrium
effects. Yet, there is a redistributive effect that raises the finance share
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in total income. The structure of the sub-sector shares within finance
depends on how the earned rents are distributed on traditional and new
finance, respectively.
b) If rents are extracted by a markup on financial service prices, there is a
redistributive effect towards (and within) the financial sector. Yet, the
mark ups affect all equilibrium values in a generally ambiguous way.
Proof. Main text.
7.3 Distorted portfolio choice
Several empirical studies have pointed out that people get confused in deal-
ing with complex financial markets (see Ce´le´rier and Valle´e (2014) and the
literature discussed there). In our model, the complex part that households
have to solve is the choice of the portfolio of the securities. The choice may
be based on a wrong assessment of relative risks and returns of different se-
curities. In this case, we have distortion within Z2 and consumption levels
planned for the future may be deceived by actual payoffs.16 As our study
focuses on structural change between X and Z as well as between Z1 and
Z2, we do not consider such distortions here. Rather we focus on distor-
tions coming from misperception of the opportunities to save by securities
investment rather than in deposits.
In particular, people may have wrong beliefs µ˜ about the measure of fu-
ture environments covered by state-contingent securities, relative to the non-
16Falkinger (2014) focuses on such distortions in a one sector economy.
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covered part of possible future events. They may also misjudge the relative
payoff of deposits compared to the payoffs of securities and base their de-
cisions on a distorted ρ˜. Such distortions affect the propensities to save in
deposits and in securities. For instance, if agents are euphoric about invest-
ments in securities and believe that µ˜ > µ or ρ˜ < ρ, then sf rises while
sd declines. The total propensity to save, however, does not change in the
benchmark model with pz1 = pz2 .
17 Therefore, the only consequence of µ˜ > µ
or ρ˜ < ρ is sectoral change within the financial sector. According to (33), Φ
rises.
Proposition 10. Euphoric beliefs about measure or performance of state-
contingent financial instruments lead to within sectoral change from Z1 to
Z2. Equilibrium skill premium and (X,Z)-structure are not affected in the
benchmark model (with identical technologies in Z1 and Z2).
Proof. Equation (33).
7.4 Participation constraints
Suppose that a fixed fee τ is charged only to agents who invest in securities.
Moreover, assume that there is a participation constraint:
yL > y¯ > yL − τ,
yH > yH − τ > y¯.
17For pz1 6= pz2 , however, we would have sd +
sf
p for the marginal propensity to save,
as shown by (23). Thus, µ and ρ impact also on ZD and therefore on ω and all other
equilibrium outcomes. See Section 8 for a more detailed discussion.
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Then low-skilled agents do not participate in the securities market, while
high-skilled agents do. According to equation (B.4) in Appendix B, we have
for l = L:
sL = dL =
δ
1 + δ
yL − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
.
For l = H, saving behavior is given by (20) and (21) with y¯+ = y¯ + τ .
This gives us the following aggregate saving levels:
D =
δ
1 + δ
1
1 + pz
[
(yL − y¯)L¯+ sd(y
H − y¯+)H¯
]
+
e¯1
r
N
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
H¯
1 + pz
(yH − y¯+)
S =
(
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯ − τ H¯
N
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
)
N.
Comparing S with ZD in (37), we see that fee τ , combined with the par-
ticipation constraint, impacts on ZD and thus on the skill premium and the
(X,Z)-structure like an increase of e¯0 to
e˜0 = e¯0 + τ
H¯
N
.
Moreover, F
D
=
sf H¯
(yL−y¯)L¯
yH−y¯+
+sdH¯+
1+δ
δ
(1+pz)e¯1
r
N
yH−y¯+
is declining in τ . Thus, the
participation constraint does not change the comparative static effects of
fixed cost τ described in Proposition 8.
The above conclusion is only valid if τF is absorbed by real fixed cost require-
ments as discussed in Section 7.1. If τF is a rent which is redistributed back
to high-skilled agents, as in Section 7.2, we have (yH− y¯−τ)H¯+τH¯ = yH− y¯
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instead of yH − y¯+ so that
D =
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
N (1− sfβH) +
e¯1
r
N
F = sf
δ
1 + δ
H¯
1 + pz
(yH − y¯)
S =
(
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
+
e¯1
r
)
N
with βH ≡
yH−y¯
w¯−y¯
H¯
N
denoting the income share of high-skilled agents. For the
high-skilled nothing changes, but the low-skilled are only saving through D.
This means that, compared to the benchmark, we have an increase in D
and a decrease in F . ZD = S coincides with the expression in (30) so that
equilibrium skill premium and (X,Z)-structure are not changed compared
to the baseline.18
For the within sectoral structure in the Z-sector, we have in the benchmark
case with pz1 = pz2 = pz:
F
D
=
sfβH
1− sfβH +
1+δ
δ
1+pz
w¯−y¯
e¯1
r
=
sfβH η¯
sdη¯ + sf (1− βH)η¯ +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
≡ Φ˜
Comparing this with (33), we conclude that Φ˜ < Φ because sf (1− βH) > 0.
Yet, the proportion of total expenditure on new finance relative to expendi-
ture on traditional finance pzF+τH¯
pzD
= F
D
+ τH¯
pzD
is ambiguous. Rent τ increases
the new finance share, but the participation constraint induces a shift of the
portfolio towards safe assets.
18For pz1 6= pz2 , however, the change in Z
D
2 would also affect ω and all other equilibrium
outcomes.
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7.5 Set-up capital for firms
In the baseline model invested capital is transformed by linear technologies,
using capital as the only input, into future outcome. The extension in this
section shows that the baseline can be seen as kind of reduced form of a
richer model, in which capital is needed to set up firms. We assume now
that firms in the X-sector use capital to set up technology Gx, which then
produces output by employing low-skilled and high-skilled labor. Each es-
tablished firm ν ∈ {1, ...,M} produces a variety xν = G
x(Lxν , Hxν ) under
monopolistic competition with free entry. Consumers spend the supernu-
merary income et − e¯t according to a CES-utility function with substitution
elasticity σ > 1 symmetrically over the variants xν in the X-sector, which
implies an instantaneous indirect utility function of the form log(et− e¯t) (see
Section 7.5.1) like before. So saving decision and portfolio choice remain the
same as in the baseline model. Firms have positive operating profits which
are distributed as payoff to the investors (see Section 7.5.2).
7.5.1 Consumer problem
Let the instantaneous utility of households be given by u =
[∑M
ν=1 x
σ−1
σ
ν
] σ
σ−1
,
σ > 1. Then, prices are determined by a constant markup on unit cost of
production
pν =
σ
σ − 1
c(wH , wL), (47)
where c(wH , wL) are the unit costs (as in Section 2) and wH , wL are factor
prices. Moreover, demand for variety xν of a household that spends “super-
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numerary budget” e− e¯ is
xν = (e− e¯)
p−σν
P 1−σ
, P ≡
[
M∑
ν=1
p1−σν
] 1
1−σ
.
Since product variants use identical production technologies, their unit cost
and prices are identical, too. Thus, xν reduces to x =
e−e¯
pνM
. Using this in u,
we obtain for the instantaneous indirect utility u = e−e¯
P
. We set the price as
nume´raire (i.e., pν = 1) so that the variety effect is P =M
1
1−σ . Due to the log
specification, this variety effect, though affecting the level of utility, does not
matter for the intertemporal decision.19 Thus, maxElog(u) = maxElog(et−
e¯t), which is identical to the intertemporal problem in Section 2.2.
7.5.2 Firm entry and production in the X-sector
There are two types of set-up technologies, which induce capital demand of
firms: A robust set-up technology which requires c0 units of capital. Firms set
up by the robust technology will be producing tomorrow under any condition
(i.e., in Θ and Θ¯). Furthermore, there are risky set-up technologies with set-
up input cθ, which are only effective if state θ ∈ Θ occurs. Otherwise, their
set-up fails. In an analogous way to (1), we assume
cθ = piθc1, where c1 < c0. (48)
The assumption states that set-up capital required for a robust technology is
larger than the capital required for risky technologies. Moreover, the smaller
the measure piθ of the state under which a set-up technology works, the lower
the required set-up capital.20 Robust set-up technologies are financed by
19Note that log e−e¯P = log(e− e¯)− logP so that the P -levels add to EU a constant.
20See Falkinger (2014) for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between spe-
cialization and risk. There, technologies are more productive the more narrowly they are
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loans, whereas the risky set-up techniques are financed by state-contingent
securities.
Let K0 be the aggregate set-up capital for robust technologies and denote
by Kθ, θ ∈ Θ, the aggregate set-up capital for specialized risky technologies.
Then the number of firms which can be set up is M0 =
K0
c0
and Mθ =
Kθ
cθ
,
respectively. In a closed economy, capital markets are cleared if
K0 = D, Kθ = Fθ = piθF.
Hence, we have for to total number of firms
M =


D
c0
+ F
c1
≡MΘ, if θ ∈ Θ,
D
c0
≡MΘ¯ otherwise.
After firms being set up, their operating profits earned under mark-up prices
(47) are
Π = (px − c)X =
X
σ
,
where px = 1, which implies c =
σ−1
σ
, has been used. Since firms are sym-
metric, aggregated operating profits are distributed uniformly across firms
so that operating profit per firm is:
Πm
Mm
=
X
σMm
, m ∈ {Θ, Θ¯}.
targeted to a specific environment. At the same time, they are more risky because the
realization of the specific environment is less likely. Here this idea is applied to set-up
costs rather than productivity.
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The returns on one unit of set up capital are therefore
rm =
X
c0σMm
, m ∈ {Θ, Θ¯}
Rθ =
X
cθσMΘ
, R =
X
c1σMΘ
for safe and risky investments, respectively. (piθRθ reduces to R because of
assumption cθ = piθc1.) Since the number of firms is different in Θ and Θ¯,
aggregate operating profits have to be shared among more or less firms so that
the return on robust investments ism-dependent. The relative rate of return,
rΘ
Rθ
, however, is uniquely determined by the relative set-up requirements of
specialized risky technologies compared to the robust technology. We have
ρ =
c1
c0
.
For the portfolio choice derived in Section 4 almost only the relative rate ρ
matters. The exception is e¯1
rm
, since future subsistence can only be financed
by deposits.21 This means, we have to restrict the analysis of the paper to
e¯1 = 0, or we reconcile the fluctuation of the earnings of robust firms with
a safe return on deposits by assuming that firms hold buffers and distribute
the expected profit per firm p¯i ≡ [ µ
MΘ
+ 1−µ
MΘ¯
]X
σ
to the investors.
For the general equilibrium analysis, a further caveat is in order. Under the
presented extension, return r (even if smoothed by the buffer) is endogenous.
It depends on M and X, which are determined by saving behavior and re-
source allocation, respectively. Thus, in the general equilibrium, a further
21Formally the derivation of the portfolio choice presented in the appendix has to be
adapted to account for m-dependent pay-offs in the budget constraints. For e¯1 = 0, return
rΘ¯ becomes irrelevant under the logarithm specification and the analysis remains valid –
with ρ = rΘRΘ .
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feedback loop is to be considered. We did not account for such feedbacks in
Section 6, since in the baseline return r is exogenously given by the constant
productivity of capital. For e¯1 = 0, however, the presented analysis remains
fully valid also with set-up capital of firms, since r matters only through the
term e¯1
r
. However, what one loses by setting e¯1 = 0 is the income effect on
structural change within the financial sector. For the income effect on the
skill premium and the structural change between goods and financial sector
subsistence level e¯0 > 0 is relevant, which poses no problem in the extension
considered here.
8 Robustness
To account for relative price effects within the financial sector, we skip now
Assumption 2 and impose the following restriction instead.
Assumption 2’. αx = αz1 < αz2.
Then, according to (12),
pz1 =
Ax
Az1
and thus: y¯ = e¯0 +
(1+ Ax
Az1
)e¯1
r
.
Moreover, the terms alxX + a
l
z1
Z1, l ∈ {H,L}, in system (13) reduce to
X+
1
Axκαxx
and X+
κ
(1−αx)
x
Ax
, X+ ≡ X +
Ax
Az1
Z1,
respectively. Using this when solving (13), we obtain
X+ =
bLL¯
aLx
κz2 − k
κz2 − κx
, Z2 =
bLL¯
aLz2
k − κx
κz2 − κx
(49)
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and
Z2
X+
=
Az2
Ax
γ˜(ω
+
, k
+
), γ˜(ω, k) ≡
κ
αz2
z2
καxx
k − κx
κz2 − k
, (50)
where the signs for the partial derivatives of γ˜ follow from the Rybczynski
analysis.
Substituting Az2κ
αz2
z2 for
1
aLz2
in the second equation of (49) and using (9), we
have for the Z2-supply:
ZS2 = Az2bLL¯
γ
αz2
z2
γz2 − γx
g(ω
+
, k
+
), g(ω, k) ≡ ω−αz2 (kω − γx). (51)
This coincides with (40) – with Z2 instead of Z – so that Fact 6 remains
valid under the alternative specification and applies to Z2-supply.
Z2-demand is given by
ZD2 = F = sf
δ
1 + δ
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz2
N =
µ− ρp
1− ρp
δ
1 + δ
η˜N (52)
with η˜ ≡ w¯−y¯
1+pz2
and p =
1+pz2
1+pz1
. In an analogous way to Lemma 1 and
Fact 7, one establishes that the income effect (i.e., η˜-part in ZD2 ) has an
U-shaped form.22 Further, sf is decreasing in ω since
∂p
∂ω
> 0 (according to
(12)). Because of the relative price effect p, which now is at work within
the finance sector, the demand for risky assets is substituted by demand
for safe assets if the relative price of services for securities rises. For low
values of the skill premium, we are on the downward sloping branch of the
η˜-curve so that income and substitution effect go in the same direction. In
the upward sloping part of η˜, the negative substitution effect is opposed by
a positive income effect so that the total effect of ω on ZD2 depends on the
22The only thing that changes is that now we have y¯1+pz2
with y¯ constant instead of
y¯
1+pz1
= e¯01+pz1
− e¯1r . Thus, apart from subscript z2 instead of z(= z1 = z2) in the modified
proof we have y¯ instead of e¯0 and no negative term −
e¯1
r .
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relative importance of the two effects. Numerical simulation shows that the
substitution effect is large if the price pz2 is high and the income effect is
stronger if subsistence expenditures are larger. For a high level of price pz2
(based on (12) this means, for example, a low Az2) and low subsistence levels
(such that y¯ is close to zero) the substitution effect dominates. In this case
∂ZD2
∂ω
< 0. However, for low levels of price pz2 and large subsistence levels
the income effect dominates. For this case, (51) and (52) give us the same
picture as in Figure 1. Proposition 4 remains valid in both cases.
For Proposition 5, we have to write the excess demand function ZD2 − Z
S
2
explicitly in terms of parameters. Using W = bLL¯AxΓxω
−αx(1 + ωk) and
pz2 =
AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx in (52), we can rewrite the equilibrium condition ZD2 −
ZS2 = 0 in the form:
µ− ρ
1+ AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
1+pz1
1− ρ
1+ AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
1+pz1
δ
1 + δ
Γxω
−αx(1 + ωk)− N
bLL¯Ax
y¯
1 + AxΓx
Az2Γz2
ωαz2−αx
−
Az2
Ax
γ
αz2
z2
γz2 − γx
ω−αz2 (kω − γx)
≡ D
[
ω
∣∣∣∣∣Az2Ax
?
, k
?
,
AxbLL¯
N
+
, y¯
−
, µ
+
, ρ
−
, δ
+
]
= 0.
Hence, an increase of AxbLL¯
N
always leads to a rise in the equilibrium skill
premium. Under Assumption 2, this was only the case if present subsis-
tence expenditure dominates futures subsistence requirements (Proposition
5). Moreover, a decline in subsistence requirements y¯ has unambiguously a
positive impact on the equilibrium skill premium - regardless of whether the
decline in y¯ is caused by a decline in e¯0 or e¯1.
In contrast to the benchmark analysis, the equilibrium skill premium is now
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also affected by changes in µ and ρ. Finally, a rise in δ has now an unam-
biguously positive effect on ω∗. (In the benchmark analysis the role of δ was
ambiguous.) The following proposition summarizes the comparative-static
effects on the equilibrium skill premium under Assumption 2’.
Proposition 5’. If Assumption 2 is replaced by Assumption 2’, then:
a) For y¯ > 0, a rise in AxbLL¯
N
(caused by uniform technical progress or educa-
tion and biased progress) raises the equilibrium skill premium. A decline
of total subsistence requirements y¯ (wherever they come from) have the
same effect.
b) Financial innovations (a rise in µ) or increased attractiveness of risky
investments (a decline of ρ) raise the equilibrium skill premium. A lower
discount on the future (a rise of δ) has the same effect. These effects also
hold if y¯ = 0.
Proof. Main text.
As a consequence of (50), Proposition 6 remains valid if applied to the struc-
ture between new finance on the one side and production cum traditional
finance on the other side. We have
Proposition 6’. At given Az
Ax
, k, any change in other exogenous fundamen-
tals which raises the skill premium leads to structural change from production
and traditional finance (X+) towards new finance (Z2).
Proof. Equation (50) and
∂pz2
∂ω
> 0.
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Finally, the ratio of value-added in financial sub-sector Z2 to value-added in
sub-sector Z1 is as in (33)
pz2F
pz1D
=
sf η¯
sdη¯ +
1+δ
δ
e¯1
r
pz2
1 + pz2
1 + pz1
pz1
. (53)
Since pz1 and y¯ are constant,
∂w¯
∂ω
> 0 immediately implies ∂η¯
∂ω
> 0. Hence,
for e¯1 > 0, the income effect unambiguously leads to structural change from
Z1 to Z2 if the skill premium rises. If e¯1 = 0, no such income effect is at
work; yet the relative price effect remains. For the relative price effect, we
only have to consider pz2 because pz1 is constant. Price pz2 affects the value
added structure within finance through two channels: On the one side, there
is the direct effect shown explicitly in (53). Since
∂pz2
∂ω
> 0, this channel
tends to increase the share of new finance. On the other side, however,
there is the negative substitution effect in the demand for financial services
(
∂sf
∂p
< 0 and ∂sd
∂p
> 0) which drives the sectoral structure within finance
from Z2 towards Z1. Due to this ambiguous role of the relative price effect
under the alternative specification, within structural change from Z1 to Z2
is more difficult to model than it was in the benchmark. For high levels of
price pz2 and low subsistence expenditures the substitution effect dominates.
Then, the presented model cannot predict a co-movement of ω and the within
structural change from Z1 to Z2. In the other case, however, Proposition (7)
applies.
9 Empirical evidence and numerical exercises
In this section we first provide empirical evidence on the two-fold structural
change and on wage inequality and then we carry out numerical exercises to
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show how our model can replicate the observed changes.
9.1 Empirics
9.1.1 Data
We use data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years
1980-2014. This data set allows us to split the sampled population (weighted
with the sampling weight) into our three sectors and two skill levels: The X-
sector consists of all sectors of the U.S. economy except finance. The finance
sector is finance and insurance without real estate.23 “Traditional finance” Z1
includes banking and related activities, savings institutions, including credit
unions, non-depository credit and related activities, and insurance carriers
and related activities. “New finance” Z2 is securities, commodities, funds,
trusts, and other financial investments. We define a worker (if working) to be
high-skilled if she/he holds a college degree or more. Then, H¯j is the number
of high-skilled workers in sector j ∈ {x, z1, z2} and L¯j is the number of low-
skilled workers in sector j ∈ {x, z1, z2}. For each skill level, we calculate for
the three sectors average yearly hours worked (i.e., hlj, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, l ∈
{H,L}) and the respective average hourly real wages (i.e., wlj, j ∈ {x, z1, z2},
l ∈ {H,L}).
In our data analysis we use “actual” and “normalized” numbers for employ-
ment and wage levels. The “actual” numbers use the observed sector- and
skill-specific average yearly hours worked and the respective average hourly
23This corresponds to the standard classification as in Philippon and Reshef (2007,
2012).
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wage. The “normalized” numbers are calculated all with the same basis of
hours worked and hourly wage (i.e., the ones from the X-sector).24 The
normalization allows us to separate the effects we can identify in the theo-
retical, frictionless model from two frictions observed in reality: (i) Low- and
high-skilled Z-workers work more hours per year than low- and high-skilled
X-workers. More precisely, for the U.S. over the last decades on average
a Z-worker has worked about 9% more than a X-worker. (ii) There is the
finance premium on hourly wages for low- and high-skilled Z-workers.25 CPS
data show that the finance premium increased over time and differs for the
two sub-sectors: In Z1 workers earn about 15% more than in the X-sector,
in Z2 it is even 50%.
The sectoral structure-figures below show black and gray lines: The gray
lines correspond to the “actual” numbers. The black lines correspond to the
“normalized” ones.
9.1.2 Empirical trends
As is described in the introduction and picked up in the model, financializa-
tion has several aspects: On the one hand, the weight of the financial sector
relative to non-financial business has increased; this is structural change to-
wards finance. On the other hand, the type of financial products and services
has changed; this is structural change within finance. The next two figures
24Since the skill premium is approximately identical in all three sectors in the U.S. the
skill intensities in the sectors need not be “normalized”. They already correspond to the
frictionless numbers.
25See Ce´le´rier and Valle´e (2015) or Philippon and Reshef (2007, 2012) for a detailed
empirical discussion of the finance premium.
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show the two-fold structural change.
Figure 2 shows the ratio of the total finance sector (Z-sectors) compared to
the non-finance economy (X-sector) for the U.S. based on the CPS data.
On the one hand, the figure shows that finance has attracted new employ-
ment. The employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of the financial
sector, defined by ΨEactual ≡
hHz1H¯z1+h
H
z2
H¯z2+h
L
z1
L¯z1+h
L
z2
L¯z2
hHx H¯x+h
L
x L¯x
, increased from 4.8%
in 1980 to 5.6% in 2014. The respective “normalized” ratio ΨEnormalized ≡
hHx H¯z1+h
H
x H¯z2+h
L
x L¯z1+h
L
x L¯z2
hHx H¯x+h
L
x L¯x
rose from 4.6% in 1980 to 5.1% in 2014. On the
other hand, the figure illustrates the structural change towards the financial
sector in terms of a growing wage sum ratio of finance. The wage sum ratio of
the financial sector, defined as Ψactual ≡
wHz1h
H
z1
H¯z1+w
H
z2
hHz2H¯z2+w
L
z1
hLz1 L¯z1+w
L
z2
hLz2 L¯z2
wHx h
H
x H¯x+w
L
x h
L
x L¯x
,
increased by 55% from about 5.1% in 1980 to 7.9% in 2014. The respective
“normalized” ratio Ψnormalized ≡
wHx h
H
x H¯z1+w
H
x h
H
x H¯z2+w
L
x h
L
x L¯z1+w
L
x h
L
x L¯z2
wHx h
H
x H¯x+w
L
x h
L
x L¯x
rose by
23% from 4.7% in 1980 to 5.8% in 2014. The difference between the employ-
ment (E) ratio and the wage sum ratio is the result of different skill-intensities
in the different sectors. By comparing the “normalized” black with the “ac-
tual” gray lines one sees a large difference between the two ratios of the wage
sum: More than half of the increase in the ratio of the wage sum is the result
of the frictions (i) and (ii). Yet, as the black line shows, there is still struc-
tural change towards finance if one controls for the two frictions. Comparison
of the two black lines shows that the difference between the employment ratio
and the wage sum ratio increased over time.
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Figure 2: Employment ratio and wage sum ratio of the financial sector
Notes: ΨE measures the employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of finance
(including insurance) compared to the rest of the U.S. economy. Ψ measures the ratio
of the total wage sum in finance vs. the rest of the U.S. economy. “Actual” uses the
observed sector-specific hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled), whereas
“normalized” uses the X-sector hours worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled).
Data from 1980-2014. Source: March CPS.
We observe a similar pattern for the within finance sectoral structure by
splitting total finance up into sub-sectors Z1 and Z2. Figure 3 shows the
employment ratio and the wage sum ratio of finance sub-sector Z2 compared
to the sub-sector Z1 for the U.S. since the eighties based on the CPS data set.
“New finance” (sub-sector Z2) grew strongly independent of the measure we
use: The within employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of finance
sub-sector Z2, Φ
E
actual ≡
hHz2H¯z2+h
L
z2
L¯z2
hHz1H¯z1+h
L
z1
L¯z1
, more than doubled from about 8.8%
in 1980 to 19.6% in 2014. The respective “normalized” ratio ΦEnormalized ≡
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hHx H¯z2+h
L
x L¯z2
hHx H¯z1+h
L
x L¯z1
is very similar with a rise from 8.6% in 1980 to 19.6% in 2014.
The within finance wage sum ratio, defined by Φactual ≡
wHz2h
H
z2
H¯z2+w
L
z2
hLz2 L¯z2
wHz1h
H
z1
H¯z1+w
L
z1
hLz1 L¯z1
,
increased dramatically from 11% in 1977 to 29.5% in 2012 peaking in 2009
at 40.2%. The respective “normalized” ratio Φnormalized ≡
wHx h
H
x H¯z2+w
L
x h
L
x L¯z2
wHx h
H
x H¯z1+w
L
x h
L
x L¯z1
rose from 9.3% in 1980 to 22.8% in 2014 with a peak in 2009 of 29.9%.
Hence, about two-thirds of the actual rise in the wage ratio of “new finance”
cannot be assigned to frictions: They are also observed in the “normalized”
data. The rest of the rise comes from friction (ii) (finance premium), which
is particularly strong in the finance sub-sector Z2.
10
%
40
%
30
%
20
%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
ΦEnormalized
Φnormalized
ΦEactual
Φactual
Figure 3: Employment ratio and wage sum ratio within the financial sector
Notes: ΦE measures the employment ratio (in terms of total hours worked) of “new
finance” compared to “traditional finance”. Φ measures the ratio of the total wage sum
in “new finance” vs. “traditional finance”. “Actual” uses the sector-specific hours worked
and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled), whereas “normalized” uses the X-sector hours
worked and hourly wages (for low-and high-skilled). Data from 1980-2014. Source: March
CPS.
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As argued in the introduction financialization (with the two-fold structural
change) and inequality are two closely related topics. Figure 4 shows the
development of the “normalized” skill premium calculated by ω = w
H
x
wLx
for
the U.S. since 1980, based on the CPS data. It increased from 1.46 to 1.91
in 2014.26 The time trend in ω illustrates that wage inequality increased
over time. Nowadays high-skilled workers earn nearly double as much as
low-skilled workers per hour. If one accounts in addition for the fact that
high-skilled workers work more hours, the income inequality is even larger
(e.g., 2.15 in 2014).
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Skill premium ω
Figure 4: Skill premium
Notes: ω measures the “normalized” skill premium (i.e., hourly wage of high-skilled labor
inX-sector divided by hourly-wage of low-skilled labor inX-sector). Data from 1980-2014.
Source: March CPS.
26Interestingly, the skill premium in the U.S. is about the same in the three sectors
because both low- and high-skilled workers who work in the financial industry earn a
similar relative finance premium.
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9.2 Numerics
In this section we implement our theoretical model quantitatively and use
it for several numerical exercises. These illustrate possible drivers of the
empirical developments presented in Figures 2-4. First, we calibrate our
model for the average values of the early years (1980-1994) of the observed
time span. This calibrated model is then used for comparative static analysis.
We shock it (i) by ceteris paribus shocks and (ii) by simultaneous shocks to
illustrate how the channels analyzed in our model can generate the situation
observed in later years (average values of 1995-2009).
9.2.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model such that it fits the data for the average year from
the time range 1980-1994. Exogenous values from data are used for labor
endowments L¯, H¯, hL, hH , output elasticities αj, technology in the X-sector
Ax, interest rate r
f and poverty thresholds (PT65 for young and PT
65 for
old households) as summarized in Table 1. For the subsistence levels we
assume that each worker must cover over the life cycle half of a two-people
household’s poverty threshold. Further, we account for the fact that dur-
ing the 1980-1994 time period the ratio of working-time to retirement was
LEratio = 4.61 (i.e., we divide the poverty threshold of old households by
4.61). Hence, e¯0 = PT65/2 and e¯1 = PT
65/2/4.61. The real safe return
is r = 1 + rf with rf being the Feds fund rate minus inflation and the
risky return is such that the risk premium is four percentage points (i.e.,
R = (r + 0.04)/µ). We measure the efficiency units from the model by
bl = h
l, l ∈ {H,L}, where hl are hours worked.
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Table 1: Parameters 1980-1994
Parameter Data Source Description
L¯ 95.4m CPS # Low-skilled employees
H¯ 26.2m CPS # High-skilled employees
hL 1675.1 CPS Yearly hours of low-skilled
hH 2000.8 CPS Yearly hours of high-skilled
αx 0.33 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in X
αz1 0.41 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z1
αz2 0.67 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z2
Ax 34.92 CPS Technology level in X
PT65 $ 15,564 U.S. Dep. of commerce Real poverty threshold <65
PT 65 $ 13,996 U.S. Dep. of commerce Real poverty threshold >65
LEratio 4.61 LE from World Bank Old-age ratio
rf 3.33 St.Louis Fed Real Feds fund rate
Az1 149 Model calibration Technology level in Z1
Az2 201 Model calibration Technology level in Z2
δ 0.375 Model calibration Discount rate
µ 0.750 Model calibration Certainty measure
Notes: The figures are the averaged values for the time range t = 1980 − 1994 of:
αj,t =
κj,tωj,t
1+κj,tωj,t
with κj,t =
hHj,tH¯j,t
hL
j,t
L¯j,t
and ωj,t =
wHj,t
wL
j,t
, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, h
H
t = h
H
x,t and
hLt = h
L
x,t. Ax,t =
wLx,t
Γx,tω
−αx,t
x,t
with Γx,t = αx,t
αx,t(1 − αx,t)
1−αx,t . PT is the real
poverty threshold of a two-people household (nominal values are adjusted by CPI-U-
RS-inflation) with PT65 denoting the relevant value for households younger than 65
and PT 65 denoting the value relevant for older ones. LEratio is the ratio of working-
time to retirement: (65− 20)/(LE − 65), where LE denotes life expectancy; 65 is the
retirement age and 20 is the assumed start of the working-life. rf is the real Feds fund
rate (Feds fund rate minus CPI-U-RS-inflation). CPI-U-RS-inflation data from U.S.
Dep. of labor.
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The other parameters (productivities in the finance sectors Az1 and Az2 ,
discount factor δ and completeness measure µ) are calibrated internally by
targeting wage inequality ω, “normalized” ratios for the sectoral structure
Ψ and Φ of the U.S. economy and the gross saving rate in the U.S. for the
average of the years 1980-1994. The targeted values are shown in Table
2. More specifically, we solve the model numerically for possible parameter
combinations of Az1 , Az2 , δ and µ and grid-search for the combination (see
Table 1 for calibrated values) which minimizes the sum of the squared relative
distances of the four model values from the corresponding data targets.27 The
four model values generated by our calibrated model are given in Table 2:
Table 2: Targets
Variables Model Data Source Description
ω∗ 1.54 1.59 CPS Skill premium
Ψ 5.14% 5.14% CPS Between sectoral structure
Φ 13.96% 13.95% CPS Within sectoral structure
saving rate 19.92% 19.92% World Bank Aggregate savings
Notes: ω∗ is the equilibrium skill premium (per hour worked). Ψ corresponds to
pz1D+pz2F
X
in the
model and to Ψnormalized in the data. Φ corresponds to
pz1D
pz2F
in the model and to Φnormalized in
the data. The saving rate is (D + F )/W in the model and the share of aggregate savings in gross
national income in the data, where aggregate savings (gross savings) is gross national income less total
consumption, plus net transfers.
27For solving the model numerically, we use the demand functions in the goods and
financial services markets to obtain the equilibrium values of X-, Z1- and Z2 as functions
of ω (and exogenous parameters). Substituting these functions for X-, Z1- and Z2 in one
of the labor market clearing conditions, we can solve for the equilibrium skill premium
ω∗. (Then, at ω∗, the other labor market is also cleared.) From ω∗ follow factor prices
and prices, output levels and employment in the three sectors and the sectoral structure
of the economy in a straightforward way.
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The calibrated model fits the targets fairly well. Further, the other equi-
librium values following from the model are also very similar to the values
observed in the CPS data. Hourly wages in our model are wH = $24.7 (CPS
data: $ 25.1), wL = $ 16.1 (CPS: $ 15.8) and the resulting prices are pz1 =
0.25, pz2 = 0.20.
28 Labor employments (total hours) are Hx = 49046m (CPS:
49006m), Lx = 153244m (CPS: 153143m), Hz1 = 2748m (CPS: 2785m),
Lz1 = 6085m (CPS: 5990m), Hz2 = 627m (CPS: 634m), Lz2 = 475m (CPS:
466m). For the skill intensities we get κx = 0.32 < κz1 = 0.45 < κz2 = 1.32
(corresponding data in CPS: κx = 0.32 < κz1 = 0.45 < κz2 = 1.32), which
shows that the two finance sub-sectors are more skill intensive than the rest
of the economy. These numbers show that the calibrated model matches the
U.S. economy in the period 1980-1994 fairly well.
9.2.2 Numerical exercises
We show now how our calibrated model can predict the twofold structural
change and the rising wage inequality between period 1980-1994 and period
1995-2009 as seen in Figures 2-4. To do so, we look at the prediction of our
calibrated model if shocked by exogenous changes. Thereby, we apply the
changes in the exogenous parameters of our model as observed in data. In
other words, we use as shocks the average values of L¯, H¯, hL, hH , αx, αz1 ,
αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf for the time span 1995-2009 instead of
28The magnitude of the financial services prices could be interpreted in the following wag:
A household has to pay the unit costs of financial intermediation, estimated by Philippon
(2015) to be 0.015-0.02, during all his/hers “capital-accumulation” years (∼ 15-times from
1980-1994 to 1995-2009).
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the ones for the time span 1980-1994.29 In addition, we also consider shocks
on the internally calibrated parameter Az1 , Az2 , δ and µ.
As a first exercise, we shock the model with ceteris paribus shocks. This
means that we apply each of the changes listed in Table 3 separately. For
the exogenous parameters we apply observed changes; for the internally cal-
ibrated parameters potential changes. The qualitative effects of such ceteris
paribus changes on the skill premium ω, on the between sectoral structure Ψ
and the within structure Φ are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Comparative statics
ω Ψ Φ
Uniform productivity progress Aj (income effect) + + +
X-biased technical change Ax + + +
Z1-biased technical change Az1 – – –
Z2-biased technical change Az2 – – +
Skill-biased technical change αx, αz1 , αz2 + – –
Higher subsistence requirement young e¯0 – – –
Higher subsistence requirement old e¯1 + + –
Increased skill supply k – – +
Lower safe return r ( e¯1r -channel) + + –
Lower relative return ρ + – +
More completeness µ + – +
Fall in δ – – –
Notes: + is a positive comparative static effect. – is a negative comparative static effect.
29See Table 1 in Appendix D for data of the average values for 1995-2009 of L¯, H¯, hL,
hH , αx, αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf . For R we use again a constant risk
premium of four percentage points.
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Uniform productivity progress Aj means that the productivities in all three
sectors j ∈ {X,Z1, Z2} grow with the same rate (i.e., A
1
zi
= gxA
0
zi
, where
gx = A
1
x/A
0
x is given by the observed average values of A
0
x in 1880-1994
and of A1x in 1995-2009). Consistent with Proposition 5-7 such a uniform
productivity progress leads to an increase in the skill premium as well as
to the twofold structural change. This is due to the income effect arising
through the subsistence requirements e¯0 > 0 and e¯1 > 0. Sector-biased tech-
nical change means that only the respective sector grows, while the other
two productivity levels are kept constant (as growth rate we use always the
observable rate gx). The comparative static effects of such a ceteris paribus
shock are a combination of income and substitution effects. (Sector-specific)
skill-biased technical change αj, as observed in the data for j ∈ {X,Z1, Z2},
induces clearly an increase of the skill premium. Higher subsistence require-
ments (mainly a higher e¯1 because of aging households) lead to similar effects
as predicted in Propositions 5-7. An increase in skill supply k = H¯h
H
L¯hL
leads to
within structural change because there are more high-skilled people who de-
mand more finance sub-sector Z2 services. A lower r has the same effect like
a higher e¯1. Furthermore, a lower relative return ρ (induced by an increase
of the risk premium by one percentage point) or more market completeness
µ (by ten percentage points) raise the skill premium and make new financial
services relatively more attractive compared to services for deposits. Finally,
a fall in δ to 0.335, which leads to a lower saving rate close to 18.60% as
observed on average for the time span 1995-2009, induces a decline in the
skill premium and leads to smaller financial sectors.
As a second exercise, we shock our calibrated model with simultaneous
shocks. This means, we shock our economy by using all the shocks in the
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exogenous parameters together (i.e., new average values of H¯, L¯, hH , hL, αx,
αz1 , αz1 , Ax, PT65, PT
65, LEratio and rf for time span 1995-2009). Further,
we assume uniform technological progress. This means, the productivities in
the Z-sectors develop identical to the productivity in the X-sector. Discount
parameter δ and completeness measure µ are held fixed at the calibrated
values. With this procedure, we get a quantitative model prediction which
can then be compared with the empirical development (see Table 4). Under
simultaneous shocks our model predicts a rise in the skill premium ω from
1.54 to 1.85 and two-fold structural change towards and within finance with
a rise of Ψ from 5.14% to 5.29% and a rise of Φ from 13.96% to 15.27%.
Table 4: Predictions
Variables Model Data Source Description
ω∗ 1.85 1.85 CPS Skill premium
Ψ 5.29% 5.53% CPS Between sectoral structure
Φ 15.27% 23.47% CPS Within sectoral structure
Notes: ω∗ is the equilibrium skill premium (per hour worked). Ψ corresponds to
pz1D+pz2F
X
in the
model and to Ψnormalized in the data. Φ corresponds to
pz1D
pz2F
in the model and to Φnormalized in
the data.
Comparing the model values with data, we see that the simulated equilibrium
values underestimate the between structural change (only a little) and mainly
the within structural change. This means, additional shocks are needed to
come closer to data values. According to our analysis, possible candidates for
such additional shocks (unobserved in our data) are: More market complete-
ness (µ-shock), biased technical change in the Z-sectors (shown in Table
3) or diminished fixed costs in the financial sector and distorted portfolio
choices as discussed in Section 7. Overall, the simulated development in our
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calibrated model illustrates the channels that lead to the observed rise in
the skill premium and the two-fold structural change towards and within the
financial sector fairly well; at least as far as these changes are caused by
economic fundamentals. As pointed out in the beginning of this section, the
normalized financial sector ratios considered here are amplified in reality by
rents.
10 Conclusion
The presented 3x3 model of production and financial services helps to ex-
plain the two-fold structural change towards and within the financial sec-
tor. The analysis emphasized demand side effects by using quasi-homothetic
preferences of the Stone-Geary form and accounted for supply side effects by
considering for different skill-intensities in production of goods and financial
services. The theoretical analysis was based on established building blocks
for modeling a multi-sector economy with production and was at the same
time sufficiently tractable to allow analytical results. The comparative-static
equilibrium analysis showed the effects of productivity progress and technical
change, skill supply, present and future subsistence requirements and finan-
cial product innovation on the skill premium and on the sectoral structure of
an economy. Both the size of the financial sector relative to the non-financial
sector as well as the size of the new finance sector relative to the traditional
finance sector were considered. Moreover, in several extensions the robust-
ness of the results was discussed and the effects of rents or distortions in
the financial sector were addressed. The main insight of the results from
the theoretical analysis can be summarized as follows: If one looks for a sin-
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gle economic source (apart from assuming rents or distortions) that could
explain the twofold structural change towards and within finance and the
rising skill premium simultaneously, the income effect is a robust candidate.
Other channels, like relative price effects within the financial sector lead to
more ambiguous results.
The quantitative results derived in the theoretical analysis were illustrated
quantitatively by calibrating the model to U.S. data from 1980-1994. The
numerical implementation of the model shows that the subsequent develop-
ment observed in the period 1995-2009 can be explained fairly well. While
uniform productivity growth, working through the income effect, is confirmed
as a main source of structural change towards and within finance, skill biased
technical change is important too for matching the rise in the skill premium.
The paper leaves open two main questions which are important in the current
debate about real economic development and financialization. The first open
problem is the finance premium. While it is obvious that the rents revealed
by the premium contribute to inequality and blow up the structural change
towards and withing finance considered in this paper, the question where
the premium comes from is less clear. In recent years, several attempts
have been made to explain the premium by asymmetric information between
shareholders and employees in the banking sector. Yet, this can only explain
the redistribution of earnings within the financial sector. Our hypothesis is
that it is the asymmetry between financial agents and their clients which
allows to extract rents. After all, the financial sector is an expert system to
start with. It would be worthwhile to integrate this aspect into the presented
framework. Possible channels for modeling the rent-generating information
asymmetry would be intransparent cost structures or confusion by financial
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innovation (distorted µ-beliefs).
The second open question left to future research is how structural change
towards and within the financial sector affects economic productivity. The
literature on financial development and growth has identified market com-
pletion by financial innovation as an important source of growth. Does the
recent evidence on a negative effect of financial development on economic
growth indicate that the huge flood of new financial products since the 1990-
thies has not really completed markets but rather generated obfuscation? In
the framework presented in this paper such obfuscation would induce eu-
phoric beliefs about the degree of market completeness (µ), which is one
of the drivers of structural change within finance and at the same time a
possible lever for rent extraction. Another possible channel for a growth
dampening effect could be the absorption of high-skilled labor in the finance
sector, which leads to scarcity of talent outside the financial sector and may
slowdown productivity growth.
To take stocks: The empirical evidence shows that the expansion of the fi-
nancial sector and the changing structure within the financial sector towards
new finance are partly caused by the finance premium. This is a rent which
remains unexplained in the presented paper. But there are also economic
fundamentals which drive the twofold structural change. These drivers are
the focus of the paper. The main explanation for the observed two fold
structural change is a rise in average income generated by uniform produc-
tivity growth across sectors and factors, which changes demand for financial
services, combined with skill-biased technical change that drives up the skill
premium.
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Could the structural change towards and within finance, accompanied by a
rise in the skill premium, come to a halt? According to our model, apart
from a slowdown of growth, the following factor exert downward pressure
on finance shares and skill premium: Finance-biased productivity progress,
less attractive risky investments, a decline in the saving rate or a stop in the
proliferation of new financial products.
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A Portfolio Choice
Agent index l is skipped in the appendix. If financial intermediaries take ex-
ante a fee in the form T = pz1d+pz2(s−d), the expected utility maximization
problem is given by:
max
s,{fθ}θ∈Θ,d
EU = log(e0− e¯0)+δ
[
µ
∑
θ∈Θ
piθ log(eθ − e¯1) + (1− µ) log(eΘ¯ − e¯1)
]
s.t.
e0 + (1 + pz2)s+ (pz1 − pz2)d = y, (A.1)
eθ =


Rθfθ + rd, if θ ∈ Θ
rd, otherwise
(A.2)
s =
∑
θ∈Θ
fθ + d. (A.3)
Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (A.3) the first-order
conditions of the households’ expected utility maximization problem give:
∂L
∂s
= −
1 + pz2
e0 − e¯0
+ λ = 0, (A.4)
∂L
∂fθ
= δµpiθ
Rθ
eθ − e¯1
− λ = 0, (A.5)
∂L
∂d
= −
pz1 − pz2
e0 − e¯0
+ δ
[
µ
∑
θ∈Θ
piθ
r
eθ − e¯1
+ (1− µ)
r
rd− e¯1
]
− λ = 0, (A.6)
∂L
∂λ
= s−
∑
θ∈Θ
fθ − d = 0. (A.7)
Using (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we have
d =
δ(1− µ)
λ
(
1+pz1
1+pz2
− r/R
) + e¯1
r
. (A.8)
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where R = piθRθ. From (A.2), (A.5) and (A.7), we have
s =
δµ
λ
+ (1− r/R)d+
1
R
e¯1. (A.9)
In the end we have
d =
δ(1− µ)
(1 + δ)P
(y − e¯0) +
(1 + µδ)(1 + pz1)− (1 + δ)(1 + pz2)r/R
r(1 + δ)P
e¯1
=
1− µ
1− pρ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
, (A.10)
where P ≡ (1 + pz1)(1− pρ), p ≡
1+pz2
1+pz1
, ρ ≡ r
R
and y¯ ≡ e¯0 +
e¯1(1+pz1 )
r
.
Combining (A.10) with (A.8) and solving for λ, we obtain
1
λ
=
y − y¯
(1 + δ)(1 + pz2)
(*)
Using this and (A.10) in (A.9), we have
s =
δ
(1 + δ)
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
µ+ (1− ρ)
p(1− µ)
1− pρ
]
+ (1− ρ)
e¯1
r
+
e¯1
R
=
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
µ− pρ+ p(1− µ)
1− pρ
+
e¯1
r
,
which can be rewritten in the form
s =
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
1 +
(pz2 − pz1)(1− µ)
(1 + pz1)(1− pρ)
]
+
e¯1
r
, (A.11)
where p− 1 =
pz2−pz1
1+pz1
has been used.
Finally, (A.7), (A.10) and (A.11) give us
f ≡
∑
θ∈Θ
fθ =
µ− pρ
1− pρ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
(A.12)
and from (A.1) we conclude
y − e0 = (1 + pz1)d+ (1 + pz2)f
=
δ
1 + δ
(y − y¯) +
(1 + pz1)e¯1
r
.
(A.13)
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For the allocation of f on fθ, θ ∈ Θ, we combine (A.2) with (A.5) to get
fθ = piθ
[
δµ
λ
+
e¯1 − rd
R
]
= piθ
δ
1 + δ
y − y¯
1 + pz2
[
µ− ρ
1− µ
1− pρ
p
]
= piθf,
where (A.10) and (*) have been used for the second equation.
B Corner solutions for securities demand
To account for the non-negativity constraint fθ ≥ 0 we have to add
∑
θ∈Θ ψθfθ
to the Lagrange function for max EU – with ψθ ≥ 0 denoting the Lagrange
multiplier for fθ ≥ 0. Then, the first order condition for fθ changes to
δµpiθ
Rθ
eθ − e¯1
− λ+ ψθ = 0 (B.1)
with ψθfθ ≤ 0.
Suppose that fθ = 0 for all θ. Then s = d and
e0 − e¯0 = y − e¯0 − (1 + pz1)d
eθ − e¯1 = rd− e¯1
(B.2)
and the first-order conditions
(s) λ =
1 + pz2
e0 − e¯0
(d) δ
[
µ
∑
θ∈S
piθ
r
eθ − e¯1
+ (1− µ)
r
rd− e¯1
]
= λ+
pz1 − pz2
e0 − e¯0
(B.3)
reduce to
δ
r
rd− e¯1
=
1 + pz1
e0 − e¯0
.
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With (B.2) this solves to
d =
1
1 + δ
[
δ(y − e¯0)
1 + pz1
+
e¯1
r
]
. (B.4)
Substituting the solution into (B.2) gives us
e0 − e¯0 =
1
1 + δ
[
y − e¯0 −
(1 + pz1)e¯1
r
]
eθ − e¯1 =
δr
(1 + δ)
[
y − e¯0
1 + pz1
−
e¯1
r
]
.
(B.5)
Using this in (B.1) we obtain: ψθ ≥ 0 if and only if
µpiθRθ ≤
1 + pz2
1 + pz1
r (B.6)
where λ =
1+pz2
e0−e¯0
has been used from (B.3).
Since piθRθ = R, (B.6) reduces to
1 + pz1
1 + pz2
µR ≤ r,
which is equivalent to Rµ(1 + pz1) ≤ (1 + pz2)r.
Hence non-negativity fθ > 0, θ ∈ Θ, requires
Rµ(1 + pz1) > (1 + pz2)r. (B.7)
C Further proofs
Proof of Fact 3. With (11) and (12) the condition yL = bLwL > y¯ = e¯0 +
(1+pz)e¯1
r
takes the form
AxΓxω
−αx
[
bL −
e¯1
rAz1Γz1
ωαz1
]
> e¯0 +
e¯1
r
.
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The left side of the equation declines in ω. Thus yL > y¯ requires
ω < ω+L

Ax
+
, Az1
+
, bL
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−

 ,
where ω+L is determined by the equation:
bL = (e¯0 +
e¯1
r
)
ωαx
AxΓx
+
e¯1
r
ωαz1
Az1Γz1
.
Proof of Lemma 1. a) Let B1 ≡ AxΓx
bLL¯
N
and B2 ≡
AxΓx
AzΓz
. Using (26) and
(12), we have
w¯ = B1ω
−αx(1 + ωk), pz = B2ω
αz−αx .
Then η¯ can be reformulated as
η¯ =
w¯ − y¯
1 + pz
=
B1ω
−αx(1 + ωk)− e¯0
1 + B2ωαz−αx
−
e¯1
r
,
where (18) is used to substitute y¯.
To get the shape of η¯, first notice that
sign
∂η¯(ω)
∂ω
= sign
∂G(ω)
∂ω
,
where G(ω) ≡ B1(1+ωk)−e¯0ω
αx
ωαx+B2ωαz
. Differentiating G(ω) we have
∂G(ω)
∂ω
=
L(ω)
(ωαx + B2ωαz)
2 ,
where
L(ω) =B1ω
αx
[
k(1− αx)−
αx
ω
]
+ B1B2ω
αz
[
k(1− αz)−
αz
ω
]
+ e¯0B2(αz − αx)ω
αx+αz−1.
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We have ∂G(ω)
∂ω
> 0 if and only if L(ω) > 0. For αx + αz > 1, L(ω) is an
increasing function in ω. Moreover,
lim
ω→0+
L = −∞, lim
ω→+∞
L = +∞.
Therefore, there exists a unique ω with L(ω) = 0 and: ∂η¯(ω)
∂ω
R 0 if and only if
ω R ω. A rise in k or e¯0 shifts L(ω) upward so that ω declines. The impacts
of B1, B2 (and thus of Ax, Az,
bLL¯
N
) on ω are ambiguous because κx < k < κz
imply k(1− αx)−
αx
ω
> 0 and k(1− αz)−
αz
ω
< 0.
b) We have
η¯ =
AxΓx
bLL¯
N
ω−αx(1 + ωk)− e¯0
1 + AxΓx
AzΓz
ωαz−αx
−
e¯1
r
.
By eye inspection we get:
η¯

ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ax+ , Az+ , k+,
bLL¯
N
+
, e¯0
−
,
e¯1
r
−


Proof of Fact 6. According to (38), ZS = AzbLL¯
γαzz
γz−γx
ω−αz(kω − γx), where
κj =
γj
ω
has been used from (9).
We have ∂ω
−αz (kω−γx)
∂ω
= ω−αz
[
(1− αz)k +
αzγx
ω
]
. This term is positive and
decreasing in ω.
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D Data
Table 5: Parameters 1995-2009
Parameter Data Source Description
L¯ 109m CPS # Low-skilled employees
H¯ 41.2m CPS # High-skilled employees
hL 1757.7 CPS Yearly hours of low-skilled
hH 2027.5 CPS Yearly hours of high-skilled
αx 0.44 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in X
αz1 0.54 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z1
αz2 0.79 CPS Output ela. of high-skilled in Z2
Ax 44.66 CPS Technology level in X
PT65 $ 15,816 U.S. Dep. of commerce Real poverty threshold <65
PT 65 $ 14,217 U.S. Dep. of commerce Real poverty threshold >65
LEratio 3.77 LE from World Bank Old-age ratio
rf 0.82 St.Louis Fed Real Feds fund rate
Az1 190.56 Model calibration + Ax-growth Technology level in Z1
Az2 257.06 Model calibration + Ax-growth Technology level in Z2
δ 0.375 Model calibration Discount rate
µ 0.750 Model calibration Certainty measure
Notes: The figures are the averaged values for the time range t = 1995 − 2009 of:
αj,t =
κj,tωj,t
1+κj,tωj,t
with κj,t =
hHj,tH¯j,t
hL
j,t
L¯j,t
and ωj,t =
wHj,t
wL
j,t
, j ∈ {x, z1, z2}, h
H
t = h
H
x,t and
hLt = h
L
x,t. Ax,t =
wLx,t
Γx,tω
−αx,t
x,t
with Γx,t = αx,t
αx,t(1 − αx,t)
1−αx,t . PT is the real
poverty threshold of a two-people household (nominal values are adjusted by CPI-U-
RS-inflation) with PT65 denoting the relevant value for households younger than 65
and PT 65 denoting the value relevant for older ones. LEratio is the ratio of working-
time to retirement: (65− 20)/(LE − 65), where LE denotes life expectancy; 65 is the
retirement age and 20 is the assumed start of the working-life. rf is the real Feds fund
rate (Feds fund rate minus CPI-U-RS-inflation). CPI-U-RS-inflation data from U.S.
Dep. of labor.
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